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Abstract—Administrative Role Based Access Control
(ARBAC) models deal with how to manage user-role assign-
ments (URA), permission-role assignments (PRA), and role-
role assignments (RRA). A wide-variety of approaches have
been proposed in the literature for URA, PRA and RRA.
In this paper, we propose attribute-based administrative
models that unify many prior approaches for URA and
PRA. The motivating factor is that attributes of various
RBAC entities such as admin users, regular users and
permissions can be used to administer URA and PRA in a
highly-flexible manner. We develop an attribute-based URA
model called AURA and an attribute-based PRA model
called ARPA. We demonstrate that AURA and ARPA can
express and unify many prior URA and PRA models.
Index Terms—Attributes, Roles, RBAC, ARBAC, Access
Control, Administration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Role-based access control (RBAC) [1], [2] is a well-
adopted access control model in enterprise settings [3],
and a well-studied access control model in the academic
community [4]. However, administration of user-role,
permission-role and role-role assignments (often referred
to as Administrative RBAC or ARBAC) is both a critical
and challenging task [5]. For example, ARBAC focusses
on assigning/revoking users to/from roles, permission
to/from roles, etc. Many approaches have been proposed
in the literature for ARBAC [5]–[9]. Most of these
approaches are role-driven—for example, in URA97 [5],
user-role assignment is determined based on prerequisite
roles of the target user. Similarly, in URA99 [6], it is de-
termined based on the target users’ current membership
in mobile and/or immobile roles.
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) has recently
gained significant attention because of its flexibil-
ity [10]–[14]. Moreover, it has proven to have the ability
to represent different access control models [12], as well
as application in different technology domains such as
cloud and Internet of Things (IoT) [15], [16]. However,
using ABAC for administrative purposes has not been
thoroughly explored. In this paper, we investigate an
attribute-based approach for administration of RBAC. In
the context of ARBAC, attributes allow for more flexi-
bility in specifying the conditions under which users and
permissions can be assigned to roles. For instance, the
notions of prerequisite roles in ARBAC97 [5], mobility
of roles in ARBAC99 [6], and organization unit in AR-
BAC02 [7] can be captured as user attributes. Similarly,
the notion of administrative roles in the above models
and the notion of administrative unit in Uni-ARBAC [9]
can be captured as attributes of administrative users.
This allows for the attribute-based models we develop
to express any of these ARBAC models and beyond.
That is, it allows our attribute-based models to express
any combination of features from prior models, and new
features that are not intuitively expressible in those prior
models. Thus, this work is motivated largely by two
critical factors: (a) since administrative RBAC has been
fairly explored in the literature, it is timely to explore
unification of these works into a coherent model that
can be configured to express prior models and beyond,
and (b) a unified model can be analyzed once for various
desirable security properties, and a single codebase can
be generated to express prior models and beyond.
The contributions of this paper are two-fold:
• We develop an attribute-based administrative model
for user-role assignment (AURA) and permission-
role assignment (ARPA). AURA deals with assign-
ing/revoking users to/from roles that is determined
based on the attributes of the administrative user and
those of the regular (target) user. ARPA deals with
assigning/revoking permissions to/from roles that is
determined based on the attributes of the adminis-
trative user and those of the target permission(s).
• Demonstrate that AURA and ARPA are capable
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of expressing many prior approaches to URA and
PRA such as ARBAC97, ARBAC99, ARBAC02,
UARBAC, and Uni-ARBAC.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we discuss related work. In Section III,
AURA and ARPA models are presented as units of
attribute based administration of RBAC (AARBAC).
Sections IV and V present algorithms that translate
prior URA and PRA instances into equivalent AURA
and ARPA instances. We conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
This paper focuses on attribute-based user-role as-
signment (AURA) and attribute-based permission-role
assignment (ARPA). In particular, we scope-out role-role
assignment as future work. Therefore, in the following
discussion, we limit to related works on URA and PRA.
ARBAC97 [5], ARBAC99 [6], ARBAC02 [7], Uni-
ARBAC [9] and UARBAC [8] are some of the prominent
prior works in administrative RBAC. All these models
deal with user-role and permission-role assignments.
In all these models, the policy for assigning a user or
a permission to a role is specified based on an explicit
and a fixed set of properties of the relevant entities that
are involved in the decision-making process, namely,
the administrative user, the target role, and the regular
user (or the permission) that is assigned to the role.
For example, in URA97, the properties that are used
include the admin role of the administrative user and
the current set of roles of the regular user. Similarly, in
UARBAC, the properties include a relationship based on
access modes between the admin user, the target role and
the regular user. However, because AURA and ARPA
are based on non-explicit and a varying set of properties
(attributes) of the relevant entities that are involved in the
decion-making process, these models are more flexible.
A closely related work is that of Al-Kahtani et.
al [17], which presents a family of models for automated
assignment of users to roles based on user attributes.
The primary focus of their work is user-role assignment
based on user attributes. Our models take a more holistic
approach to RBAC administration based on attributes
of various RBAC entities such as regular users, admin
users and permissions. The major advantage of taking
such an approach is that our models both subsume
prior approaches to RBAC administration, and allow for
specification of novel policies.
The benefits of integrating attributes into an RBAC
operational model has been investigated in the litera-
ture [10], [18], [19]. However, our work focuses on ad-
vantages of using an attribute-based approach for RBAC
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Fig. 1. Attribute Based Administration of RBAC
administration. Also, attribute-based access control [11],
[12], [20], [21] has been well-studied. Such prior ABAC
works primarily focus on operational aspects of access
control—that is, making decisions when a user requests
access to an object.
III. AARBAC: AURA AND ARPA MODELS
In this section, we present our approach for attribute-
based administrative RBAC (AARBAC). We develop
an attribute-based administrative model for user-role
assignment (called AURA) and an attribute-based admin-
istrative model for permission-role assignment (called
ARPA). Figure 1 illustrates AURA and ARPA. The en-
tities collectively involved in AURA and ARPA include
admin users and their associated attributes, regular users
and their attributes, permissions and their attributes,
roles with a hierarchy, and the operations. In AURA,
the admin users control the URA relation, while in
ARPA, they control the PRA relation. Thus, in AURA,
authorization decisions for assigning a regular user to a
role, which is an example of an operation, is made based
on attributes of the admin user and that of the regular
user. In ARPA, authorization decisions for assigning a
permission to a role is made based on attributes of the
admin user and that of the permission. In the following
subsections, the AURA and ARPA models are presented
in detail.
Table I presents the formal AURA model. As il-
lustrated in Figure 1, the entities involved in AURA
include regular users (USERS), admin users (AU), roles
(ROLES) with a role hierarchy (RH), and admin op-
erations (AOP). The goal of AURA is allow for an
admin user in AU to perform an admin operation such as
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TABLE I
AURA MODEL
– USERS is a finite set of regular users.
– AU is a finite set of administrative users.
– AOP is a finite set of admin operations such as assign and revoke.
– ROLES is a finite set of regular roles.
– RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, a partial ordering on the set ROLES.
We assume a system maintained user attribute function called roles that specifies the roles assigned to various
regular users as follows:
– assigned_roles : USERS → 2ROLES
– UATT is a finite set of regular user attribute functions.
– AATT is a finite set of administrative user attribute functions.
– For each att in UATT ∪ AATT, Scope(att) is a finite set of atomic values from which the range of the
attribute function att is derived.
– attType : UATT ∪ AATT → {set, atomic}, which specifies whether the range of a given attribute is atomic
or set valued.
– Each attribute function maps elements in USERS and AU to atomic or set values.
∀uatt ∈ UATT. uatt : USERS→
 Scope(uatt) if attType(uatt) = atomic2Scope(uatt) if attType(uatt) = set
∀aatt ∈ AATT. aatt : AU→
 Scope(aatt) if attType(aatt) = atomic2Scope(aatt) if attType(aatt) = set
– is_ordered : UATT ∪ AATT → {True, False}, specifies if the scope is ordered for each of the attributes.
– For each att ∈ UATT ∪ AATT,
if is_ordered(att) = True, Hatt ⊆ Scope(att) × Scope(att), a partially ordered attribute hierarchy, and Hatt 6= φ,
else, if is_ordered(att) = False, Hatt = φ
(For some att ∈ UATT ∪ AATT for which attType(att) = set and is_ordered(att) = True, if {a, b}, {c, d} ∈
2Scope(att) (where a, b, c, d ∈ Scope(att)), we infer {a, b} ≥ {c, d} if (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d) ∈ H*att.)
AURA model allows an administrator to perform an operation on a single user or a set of users at a time. The
authorization rule for performing an operation on a single user is as follows:
For each op in AOP, is_authorizedUop(au: AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is
allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the regular user u and the role r. This
rule is written as a logical expression using attributes of the admin user au and attributes of the regular user u.
The authorization rule for performing an operation on a set of users is as follows:
For each op in AOP, is_authorizedUop(au: AU, χ : 2USERS, r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is
allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the users in the set χ and the role r.
Here χ is a set of users that can be specified using a set-builder notation, whose rule is written using user
attributes.
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assign/revoke in AOP between a regular user in USERS
and a role in ROLES, by using attributes of various
entities. To meet this goal, we define a set of attribute
functions for the regular users (UATT) and admin users
(AATT). One of the motivations for AURA is that we
wanted AURA to have the ability to capture the features
of prior URA models such as URA97, URA99, and
URA02. As we will see, to this end, we only need
to include attributes for regular users and admin users.
While one can envision attributes for other entities in
AURA such as attributes for AOP, we limit the scope of
model design based on the above-mentioned motivation.
In addition, we also assume a system maintained user
attribute function called assigned_roles, which maps
each user to set of roles currently assigned to them.
Although the notion of roles can be captured as a user
attribute function in UATT, we made this design choice
in order to reflect the fact that role is not an optional
attribute in the context of AURA.
The attribute functions (called simply attributes from
now on) are defined as a mapping from its domain
(USERS or AU as the case may be) to its range. The
range of an attribute att, which can be atomic or set
valued, is derived from a specified set of scope of atomic
values denoted Scope(att). Whether an attribute is atomic
or set valued is specified by a function called attType.
Also, the scope of an attribute can be either ordered
or unordered, which is specified by a function called
is_ordered. If an attribute att is ordered, we require that a
corresponding hierarchy, denoted Hatt, be specified on its
scope Scope(att). Hatt is a partial ordering on Scope(att).
Note that, even in the case of a set valued attribute att,
the hierarchy Hatt is specified on Scope(att) instead of
2Scope(att). We infer the ordering between two set values
given an ordering on atomic values as explained in
Table I. (Note that H*att denotes the reflexive transitive
closure of Hatt.)
AURA supports two ways to select a set of regular
users for assigning a role. The first one allows an admin
user to identify a single regular user, a role and perform
an operation such as assign. The second one allows an
admin user to identify a set of regular users, a role and
perform an operation such as assign for all those regular
users. In this case, the selection criteria for the set of
regular users can be specified using a set-builder notation
whose rule is stated using the regular users’ attributes.
For example, is_authorizedUassign(au, {u | u ∈ USERS
∧ aunit ∈ admin_unit(u)}, r) would specify a policy
for an admin user au who identifies the set of all users
who belong to the admin unit aunit in order to assign a
role r to all those users. Finally, the authorization rule is
specified as a usual logical expression on the attributes
of admin users and those of regular users in question.
Examples can be seen in sections IV and V.
The ARPA model presented in Table II is very similar
to the AURA model. The main difference is that since
the focus of ARPA is about permission role assignment,
it replaces regular users (USERS) in AURA with per-
missions (PERMS). Similarly, it replaces user attributes
(UATT) with permission attibutes (PATT). Again, the
motivation is that in order to capture the features of prior
PRA models such as those in PRA02, UARBAC and
Uni-ARBAC, we only need attributes for admin users
and permissions. Similar to AURA, ARPA also supports
two ways to select permissions to which an admin user
can assign a role. A set of permissions can be selected
using a set-builder notation whose rule is specified using
permission attributes. Finally, the authorization rule is
specified as a logical expression in the usual way over
the attributes of the admin users and those of the
permissions.
IV. MAPPING PRIOR URA MODELS IN AURA
In this section, we demonstrate that AURA can in-
tuitively simulate the features of prior URA models. In
particular, we have developed concrete algorithms that
can convert any instance of URA97, URA99, URA02,
the URA model in UARBAC, and the URA model in
Uni-ARBAC into an equivalent instance of AURA. In
the following sections also presents example instances of
each of the prior URA models and their corresponding
instances in AURA/ARPA model followed by a formal
mapping alorithms.
A. URA97 in AURA
1) URA97 Instance: In this section we present an
example instance for URA97.
Sets and Functions:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}
• AR = {ar1, ar2}
• UA = {(u1, x1), (u1, x2), (u2, x3), (u2, x4)}
• AUA = {(u3, ar1), (u4, ar2)}
• RH = {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x4), (x4, x5), (x5, x6)}
• ARH = {(ar1, ar2)}
• CR = {x1 ∧ x2, x¯1 ∨ (x¯2 ∧ x3)}
Let cr1 = x1 ∧ x2 and, cr2 = x¯1 ∨ (x¯2 ∧ x3) be
two prerequisite conditions. Prerequisite condition cr1
is evaluated as follows:
For any u in USERS undertaken for assignment,
(∃x ≥ x1). (u, x) ∈ UA ∧ (∃x ≥ x2). (u, x) ∈ UA
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TABLE II
ARPA MODEL
– AU is a finite set of administrative users.
– AOP is a finite set of admin operations such as assign and revoke.
– ROLES is a finite set of regular roles.
– RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, a partial ordering on the set ROLES.
– PERMS is a finite set of permissions.
– AATT is a finite set of administrative user attribute functions.
– PATT is a finite set of permission attribute functions.
– For each att in AATT ∪ PATT, Scope(att) is a finite set of atomic values from which the range of the
attribute function att is derived.
– attType : AATT ∪ PATT → {set, atomic}, which specifies whether the range of given attribute is atomic
or set valued.
– Each attribute function maps elements in AU and PERMS to atomic or set values.
∀aatt ∈ AATT. aatt : AU→
 Scope(aatt) if attType(aatt) = atomic2Scope(aatt) if attType(aatt) = set
∀patt ∈ PATT. patt : PERMS→
 Scope(patt) if attType(patt) = atomic2Scope(patt) if attType(patt) = set
– is_ordered : AATT ∪ PATT → {True, False}, specifies if the scope is ordered for each of the attributes.
– For each att ∈ AATT ∪ PATT,
if is_ordered(att) = True, Hatt ⊆ Scope(att) × Scope(att), a partially ordered attribute hierarchy, and Hatt 6= φ
else, if is_ordered(att) = False, Hatt = φ
(For some att ∈ PATT ∪ AATT for which attType(att) = set and is_ordered(att) = True, if {a, b}, {c, d} ∈
2Scope(att) (where a, b, c, d ∈ Scope(att)), we infer {a, b} ≥ {c, d} if (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d) ∈ H*att.)
ARPA model allows an administrator to perform an operation on a single permission or a set of permissions at
a time. The authorization rule for performing an operation on a single permission is as follows:
For each op in AOP, is_authorizedPop(au: AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is
allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the permission p and the role r. This
rule is written as a logical expression using attributes of the admin user au and attributes of the permission p.
The authorization rule for performing an operation on a set of permissions is as follows.
For each op in AOP, is_authorizedPop(au: AU, χ : 2PERMS, r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is
allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the permissions in the set of χ and the
role r.
Here χ is a set of permissions that can be specified using a set-builder notation, whose rule is written using
permission attributes.
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cr2 is evaluated as follows:
For any u in USERS undertaken for assignment,
(∀x ≥ x1). (u, x) /∈ UA ∨ ((∀x ≥ x2). (u, x) /∈ UA ∧
(∃x ≥ x3). (u, x) ∈ UA)
Let can_assign and can_revoke be as follows:
can_assign = {(ar1, cr1, {x4, x5}), (ar1, cr2, {x6})}
can_revoke = {(ar1, {x4, x5, x6})}
2) Equivalent URA97 Instance in AURA: In this
segment AURA instance equivalent to aforementioned
URA97 instance in presented based on the AURA model
depicted in Table I.
Sets and functions
• USERS ={u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AOP = {assign, revoke}
• ROLES = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}
• RH = {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x4), (x4, x5), (x5, x6)}
• assigned_roles(u1) = {x1, x2},
assigned_roles(u2) = {x3, x4}
• UATT = {}
• AATT = {aroles}
Scope(aroles) = {ar1, ar2}, attType(aroles) = set,
is_ordered(aroles) = True, Haroles = {(ar1, ar2)}
• aroles(u3) = {ar1}, aroles(u4) = {ar2}
Authorization rules for user-role assignment and revoca-
tion for the given instance can be expressed respectively,
as follows:
– is_authorizedUassign(au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES)
≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {x4, x5} ∧
((∃x ≥ x1). x ∈ roles(u) ∧ (∃x ≥ x2). x ∈ roles(u)) ∨
(∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {x6} ∧
((∃x ≥ x1). x /∈ roles(u) ∨ ((∃x ≥ x2). x /∈ roles(u) ∧
(∃x ≥ x3). x ∈ roles(u)))
– is_authorizedUrevoke(au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES)
≡ (∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {x4, x5, x6}
3) MAPURA97: MapURA97 is an algorithm for map-
ping a URA97 instance into equivalent AURA in-
stance. Sets and functions from URA97 and AURA
are marked with superscripts 97 and A, respectively.
MapURA97 takes URA97 instance as its input. In par-
ticular, input for MapURA97 fundamentally consists of
USERS97, ROLES97, AR97, UA97 and AUA97, RH97,
ARH97, can_assign97 and can_revoke97.
Output from MapURA97 algorithm is an equivalent
AURA instance, with primarily consisting of USERSA,
AUA, AOPA, ROLESA, RHA, For each u ∈ USERSA,
assigned_rolesA(u), UATTA, AATTA, For each attribute
Algorithm 1. MapURA97
Input: URA97 instance
Output: AURA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in AURA */
a. USERSA ← USERS97 ; AU ← USERS97
b. AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
c. ROLESA ← ROLES97 ; RHA ← RH97
d. For each u ∈ USERSA, assigned_rolesA(u) = φ
e. For each (u, r) ∈ UAA,
assigned_rolesA(u)' = assigned_rolesA(u) ∪ r
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in AURA */
a. UATTA ← φ ; AATTA ← {aroles}
b. ScopeA(aroles) = AR97 ; attTypeA(aroles) = set
c. is_orderedA(aroles) = True ; HAaroles ← ARH97
d. For each u ∈ AUA, aroles(u) = φ
e. For each (u, ar) in AUA97,
aroles(u) = aroles(u) ∪ ar
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in AURA */
a. assign_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can_assign97,
assign_formula' = assign_formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧
(translate(cr)))
c. auth_assign = is_authorizedUassign(au : AU
A,
u : USERSA, r : ROLESA) ≡ assign_formula'
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for AURA */
a. revoke_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, Z) ∈ can_revoke97
revoke_formula' = revoke_formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z)
c. auth_revoke = is_authorizedUrevoke(au : AU
A,
u : USERSA, r : ROLESA) ≡ revoke_formula'
att ∈ UATTA ∪ AATTA, ScopeA(att), attTypeA(att),
is_orderedA(att) and HAatt, For each user u ∈ USERSA,
and for each att ∈ UATTA ∪ AATTA, att(u), Authoriza-
tion rule for assign (auth_assign) and Authorization rule
for revoke (auth_revoke).
As indicated in MapURA97, there are four main steps
for mapping. In Step 1, sets and functions from URA97
are mapped into AURA sets and functions. In Step 2,
user attributes and administrative user attribute functions
are expressed. As we do not need user attributes in
representing an equivalent AURA for URA97, UATT
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Support routine for Algorithm 1. translate97
Input: A URA97 prerequisite condition, cr
Output: An equivalent sub-rule for AURA authoriza-
tion assign rule.
1: rule_string = φ
2: For each symbol in cr,
3: if symbol is a role and in the form x
(i.e., the user holds role x)
4: rule_string' = rule_string +
(∃x' ≥ x). x' ∈ assigned_rolesA(u)
5: else if symbol is a role and in the form x¯
(i.e., the user doesn’t hold role x)
6: rule_string' = rule_string +
(∃x' ≥ x). x' /∈ assigned_rolesA(u)
7: else
8: rule_string' = rule_string + symbol
/* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */
9: end if
is set to null. Admin user attribute aroles captures
the notion of admin roles in URA97. Step 3 involves
constructing assign_formula in AURA that is equivalent
to can_assign97 in URA97. can_assign97 is a set of
triples. Each triple bears information on whether an
admin role can assign a candidate user to a set of
roles. Equivalent translation of can_assign97 in AURA is
given by is_authorizedUassign(au : AU
A, u : USERSA, r
: ROLESA). Similarly, In Step 4, revoke_formula equiv-
alent to can_revoke97 is presented. A support routine
translate97 for MapURA97 translates prerequisite condi-
tion.
B. URA99 in AURA
1) URA99 Instance: In this segment, we present
an example instance of URA99 model as follows:
Sets and functions:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}
• AR = {ar1, ar2}
• UA = {(u1, Mx1), (u2, IMx1), (u2, IMx2),
(u1, IMx3)}
• AUA = {(u3, ar1), (u4, ar2)}
• RH = {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x4), (x4, x5), (x5, x6)}
• ARH = {(ar1, ar2)}
• CR = {x1 ∧ x2, x¯1}
Algorithm 2. MapURA99
Input: URA99 instance
Output: AURA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in AURA */
a. USERSA ← USERS99 ; AUA ← USERS99
b. ROLESA ← ROLES99 ; RHA ← RH99
c. AOPA ← {mob-assign, immob-assign,
mob-revoke, immob-revoke}
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in AURA */
a. UATTA = {exp_mob_mem, imp_mob_mem,
exp_immob_mem, imp_immob_mem}
b. Scope(exp_mob_mem) = ROLESA
c. attType(exp_mob_mem) = set
d. is_ordered(exp_mob_mem) = True
e. Hexp_mob_mem = RH
A ; For each u ∈ USERSA,
exp_mob_mem(u) = φ
f. For each (u, Mr) ∈ UA99,
exp_mob_mem(u) = exp_mob_mem(u) ∪ r
g. Scope(imp_mob_mem) = ROLESA
h. attType(imp_mob_mem) = set
i. is_ordered(imp_mob_mem) = True
j. Himp_mob_mem = RH
A ; For each u ∈ USERSA,
imp_mob_mem(u) = φ
k. For each (u, Mr) ∈ UA99 and for each r > r',
imp_mob_mem(u) =
imp_mob_mem(u) ∪ r'
l. Scope(exp_immob_mem) = ROLESA
m. attType(exp_immob_mem) = set
n. is_ordered(exp_immob_mem) = True
o. Hexp_immob_mem = RH
A
p. For each u ∈ USERSA,
exp_immob_mem(u) = φ
q. For each (u, IMr) ∈ UA99,
exp_immob_mem(u) =
exp_immob_mem(u) ∪ r
r. Scope(imp_immob_mem) = ROLESA
s. attType(imp_immob_mem) = set
t. is_ordered(imp_immob_mem) = True
u. Himp_immob_mem = RH
A ; For each u ∈ USERSA,
imp_immob_mem(u) = φ
v. For each (u, IMr) ∈ UAA and for each r > r'
imp_immob_mem(u) =
imp_immob_mem(u) ∪ r'
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Continuation of Algorithm 2. MapURA99
w. AATTA ← {aroles} ; Scope(aroles) = AR99
x. attType(aroles) = set ; is_ordered(aroles) = True
y. Haroles = RH
A ; For each u ∈ AUA, aroles(u) = φ
z. For each (u, ar) in AUA99,
aroles(u) = aroles(u) ∪ ar
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in AURA */
a. assign-mob-formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-assign-M99,
assign-mob-formula' =
assign-mob-formula ∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈
aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧ (translate(cr, assign)))
c. auth_mob_assign =
is_authorizedUmob-assign(au : AU
A, u : USERSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ assign-mob-formula'
d. assign-immob-formula = φ
e. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-assign-IM99,
assign-immob-formula' =
assign-immob-formula ∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar'
∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧ (translate(cr, assign)))
f. auth_immob_assign =
is_authorizedUimmob-assign(au : AU
A, u :
USERSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ assign-immob-formula'
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule in AURA */
a. revoke-mob-formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-revoke-M99,
revoke-mob-formula' = revoke-mob-formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧
(translate(cr, revoke)))
c. auth_mob_revoke =
is_authorizedUmob-revoke(au : AU
A, u : USERSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ revoke-mob-formula'
d. revoke-immob-formula = φ
e. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-revoke-IM99,
revoke-immob-formula' =
revoke-immob-formula ∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈
aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧ (translate(cr, revoke)))
f. auth_immob_revoke =
is_authorizedUimmob-revoke(au : AU
A, u :
USERSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ revoke-mob-formula'
Support routine for algorithm 2. translate99
Input: A URA99 prerequisite condition (cr),
op ∈ {assign, revoke}
Output: An equivalent sub-rule for AURA authorization
assign rule.
1: rule_string = φ
2: For each symbol in cr
3: if op = assign ∧ symbol is a role
and in the form x (i.e., the user holds role x)
4: rule_string = rule_string + x ∈ exp_mob_mem(u)
∨ (x ∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∧ x /∈ exp_immob_mem(u))
else if op = revoke ∧ symbol is a role
and in the form x (i.e., the user holds role x)
5: rule_string = rule_string + (x ∈ exp_mob_mem(u)
∨ x ∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∨ x ∈ exp_immob_mem(u)
∨ x ∈ imp_immob_mem(u))
6: else if op = assign ∨ revoke ∧ symbol is role
and in the form x¯ (i.e., the user doesn’t hold
role x)
7: rule_string = rule_string + (x /∈ exp_mob_mem(u)
∧ x /∈ imp_mob_mem(u) ∧
x /∈ exp_immob_mem(u) ∧
x /∈ imp_immob_mem(u))
8: else
9: rule_string = rule_string + symbol
/* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */
10: end if
Let cr1 = x1 ∧ x2 and, cr2 = x¯1. cr1 is evaluated as
follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assignment,
((u, Mx1) ∈ UA ∨ ((∃x' ≥ x1). (u, Mx') ∈ UA) ∧
(u, IMx1) /∈ UA)) ∧ ((u, Mx2) ∈ UA ∨
((∃x' ≥ x2). (u, Mx') ∈ UA) ∧ (u, IMx2) /∈ UA)
cr2 is evaluated as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assignment,
(u, Mx1) /∈ UA ∧ ((∃x' ≥ x1). (u, Mx') /∈ UA) ∧
(u, IMx1) /∈ UA ∧ ((∃x' ≥ x1). (u, IMx') /∈ UA)
Let can-assign-M and can-assign-IM in URA99 be as
follows:
can-assign-M = {(ar1, cr1, {x4, x5})}
can-assign-IM= {(ar1, cr2, {x5, x6})}
Unlike URA97, there is a notion of prerequisite con-
dition in URA99 revoke model. We have considered
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same prerequisite conditions for both grant and revoke
models instances for simplicity. Prerequisite conditions
for URA99 revoke model are evaluated as follows:
cr1 is evaluated as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS that needs to be revoked,
((u, Mx1) ∈ UA ∨ (u, IMx1) ∈ UA ∨ ((∃x' ≥ x1).
(u, Mx') ∈ UA) ∨ ((∃x' ≥ x1). (u, IMx') ∈ UA)) ∧
((u, Mx2) ∈ UA ∨ (u, IMx2) ∈ UA ∨ ((∃x' ≥ x2).
(u, Mx') ∈ UA) ∨ ((∃x' ≥ x2). (u, IMx') ∈ UA))
cr2 is evaluated as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS that needs to be revoked,
(u, Mx1) /∈ UA ∧ (u, IMx1) /∈ UA ∧ ((∃x' ≥ x1). (u,
Mx') /∈ UA) ∧ ((∃x' ≥ x1). (u, IMx') /∈ UA)
can-revoke-M and can-revoke-IM are as follows:
can-revoke-M = {(ar1, cr1, {x3, x4, x5})}
can-revoke-IM= {(ar1, cr2, {x5, x6})}
2) Equivalent URA99 Instance in AURA: An equiva-
lent AURA instance for aforementioned URA99 example
instance is presented in this segment.
Set and functions:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}
• RH = {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x4), (x4, x5), (x5, x6)}
• assigned_roles(u1) = {Mx1, IMx3},
assigned_roles(u2) = {IMx1, IMx3}
• AOP = {mob-assign, immob-assign, mob-revoke,
immob-revoke}
• UATT= {exp_mob_mem, imp_mob_mem,
exp_immob_mem, imp_immob_mem}
• Scope(exp_mob_mem) = ROLES
attType(exp_mob_mem) = set
is_ordered(exp_mob_mem) = True
Hexp_mob_mem = RH
• Scope(imp_mob_mem)= ROLES
attType(imp_mob_mem) = set
is_ordered(imp_mob_mem) = True
Himp_mob_mem = RH
• Scope(exp_immob_mem) = ROLES,
attType(exp_immob_mem) = set
is_ordered(exp_immob_mem) = True
Hexp_immob_mem = RH
• Scope(imp_immob_mem) = ROLES
attType(imp_immob_mem) = set
is_ordered(imp_immob_mem) = True
Himp_immob_mem = RH
AATT = {aroles}
• Scope(aroles) = {ar1, ar2}
attType(aroles) = set, is_ordered(aroles) = True,
Haroles = {(ar1, ar2)}
• aroles(u3) = {ar1}, aroles(u4) = {ar2}
Authorization rules for assignment and revocation of
a user as a mobile member of role can be expressed
respectively, as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS, undertaken for assignment,
– is_authorizedUmob-assign(au : AR, u : USERS,
r : ROLES) ≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x4, x5} ∧ (x1 ∈
exp_mob_mem(u) ∨ (x1 ∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∧ x1 /∈ exp_immob_mem(u))) ∧ (x2 ∈
exp_mob_mem(u) ∨ (x2 ∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∧ x2 /∈ exp_immob_mem(u)))) ∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar1).
ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x5, x6} ∧ (x1 /∈
exp_mob_mem (u) ∧ x1 /∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∧ x1 /∈ exp_immob_mem(u) ∧ x1 /∈
imp_immob_mem (u)))
For any user u ∈ USERS that needs to be revoked,
– is_authorizedUmob-revoke(au : AR, u : USERS,
r : ROLES) ≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x3, x4, x5} ∧
((x1 ∈ exp_mob_mem(u) ∨ x1 ∈
imp_mob_mem(u) ∨ x1 ∈ exp_immob_mem(u)
∨ x1 ∈ imp_immob_mem) ∧ (x2 ∈
exp_mob_mem(u) ∨ x2 ∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∨ x2 ∈ exp_immob_mem(u) ∨ x2 ∈
imp_immob_mem)) ∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u)
∧ r ∈ {x5, x6} ∧ x1 /∈ exp_mob_mem(u) ∧ x1 /∈
imp_mob_mem(u) ∧ x1 /∈ exp_immob_mem(u)
∧ x1 /∈ imp_immob_mem(u))
Authorization rules for assignment and revocation of
a user as an immobile member of role can be expressed
respectively, as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS, undertaken for assignment,
– is_authorizedUimmob-assign(au : AR, u : USERS,
r : ROLES) ≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x5, x6} ∧ (x1 ∈
exp_mob_mem(u) ∨ (x1 ∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∧ x1 /∈ exp_immob_mem(u))) ∧ (x2 ∈
exp_mob_mem(u) ∨ (x2 ∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∧ x2 /∈ exp_immob_mem(u)))) ∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar1).
ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x5, x6} ∧ (x1 /∈
exp_mob_mem(u) ∧ x1 /∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∧ x1 /∈ exp_immob_mem(u) ∧
x1 /∈ imp_immob_mem(u)))
For any user u ∈ USERS that needs to be revoked,
9
– is_authorizedUimmob-revoke(au : AR, u : USERS,
r : ROLES) ≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x5, x6} ∧
((x1 ∈ exp_mob_mem(u) ∨ x1 ∈
imp_mob_mem(u) ∨ x1 ∈ exp_immob_mem(u)
∨ x1 ∈ imp_immob_mem) ∧ (x2 ∈
exp_mob_mem(u) ∨ x2 ∈ imp_mob_mem(u)
∨ x2 ∈ exp_immob_mem(u) ∨ x2 ∈
imp_immob_mem)) ∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u)
∧ r ∈ {x5, x6} ∧ x1 /∈ exp_mob_mem(u) ∧ x1 /∈
imp_mob_mem(u) ∧ x1 /∈ exp_immob_mem(u)
∧ x1 /∈ imp_immob_mem(u))
3) MapURA99: Algorithm MapURA99 is an algorithm
for mapping a URA99 instance into equivalent AURA
instance. Sets and functions from URA99 and AURA
are marked with superscripts 99 and A, respectively.
MapURA99 takes URA99 instance as its input. In partic-
ular, input for MapURA99 fundamentally has USERS
99,
ROLES99, AR99, UA99, AUA99, RH99, ARH99, can-
assign-M99, can-assign-IM99, can-revoke-M99, and can-
revoke-IM99.
Output from MapURA99 algorithm is an equivalent
AURA instance, with primarily consisting of following
sets and functions: USERSA, AUA, ROLESA, RHA,
AOPA, UATTA, AATTA, For each attribute att ∈ UATTA
∪ AATTA, Scope(att), attType(att), is_ordered(att) and
Hatt, For each user u ∈ USERS, and for each aatt
∈ AATTA, aatt(u), For each user u ∈ USERSA, and
for each uatt ∈ UATTA, uatt(u), Authorization rule for
mobile assign (auth_mob_assign), Authorization rule for
mobile revoke (auth_mob_revoke), Authorization rule
for immobile assign (auth_immob_assign), and Autho-
rization rule for immobile revoke (auth_immob_revoke).
As shown in Algorithm MapURA99, there are four
main steps required in mapping any instance of URA99
model to AURA instance. In Step 1, sets and functions
from URA99 instance are mapped into AURA sets and
functions. In Step 2, user attributes and administrative
user attribute functions are expressed. There are four
regular user attributes, exp_mob_mem, imp_mob_mem,
exp_immob_mem, and imp_immob_mem. Each captures,
a user’s explicit mobile membership, implicit mobile
membership, explicit immobile membership and implicit
immobile membership on roles, respectively. Admin user
attribute aroles captures admin roles assigned to admin
users. Step 3 involves constructing assign-mob-formula
and assign-immob-formula in AURA that is equivalent
to can-assign-M and can-assign-IM in URA99, respec-
tively, in URA99. Both can-assign-M and can-assign-
IM are set of triples. Each triple bears information on
whether an admin role can assign a candidate user to
a set of roles as a mobile member in the case of can-
assign-M and, as an immobile member in the case of
can-assign-IM. AURA equivalent for can-assign-M is
given by is_authorizedUmob-assign(au : AU
A, u : USERSA,
r : ROLESA) and an equivalent translation for can-
assign-IM is given by is_authorizedUimmob-assign(au :
AUA, u : USERSA, r : ROLESA). Similarly, In Step
4, revoke-mob-formula equivalent to can-revoke-M and
can-revoke-IM are presented. translate99 is a support
routine for MapURA99 that translates prerequisite con-
dition in URA99 into its AURA equivalent. A com-
plete example instance and its corresponding equivalent
AURA instances are presented in Section IV-B1 and
Section IV-B2, respectively.
C. URA02 in AURA
In this section we present an example instance
of URA02 model followed by an equivalent AURA
instance. We also present a translation algorithm,
MapURA02 that converting URA02 instance to AURA
instance.
1) URA02 Instance: In URA02, decision to as-
sign/revoke user-role can be made based on two factors,
a user’s membership on role or a user’s membership in
an organization unit. They can be viewed as two different
cases. In this example instance we represent roles with
r and organization units with x for simplicity.
Sets and functions:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}
• AR = {ar1, ar2}
• UA = {(u1, r1), (u1, r2), (u2, r3), (u2, r4)}
• AUA = {(u3, ar1), (u4, ar2)}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4), (r4, r5), (r5, r6)}
• ARH = {(ar1, ar2)}
• ORGU = {x1, x2, x3}
• OUH = {(x3, x2), (x2, x1)}
• UUA = {(u1, x1), (u2, x3)}
Case 1:
• CR = {r1 ∧ r2, r1 ∨ r¯2 ∧ x3}
Let cr1 = r1 ∧ r2 and, cr2 = r1 ∨ r¯2 ∧ r3
Case 2:
• CR = {x1 ∧ x2, x1 ∨ x¯2 ∧ x3}
Let cr3 = x1 ∧ x2 and, cr4 = x1 ∨ x¯2 ∧ x3
Case 1:
cr1 is evaluated as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assginment,
(∃r ≥ r1). (u, r) ∈ UA ∧ (∃r ≥ r2). (u, r) ∈ UA
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Algorithm 3. MapURA02
Input: URA02 instance
Output: AURA instance
Begin:
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in AURA */
a. USERSA ← USERS02 ; AUA ← AU02
b. AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
c. ROLESA ← ROLES02
d. RHA ← ROLES02
e. For each u ∈ USERSA, assigned_roles(u) = φ ;
f. For each (u, r) ∈ UA02, assigned_roles(u) ∪ r
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions to AURA */
a. UATTA ← {org_units}
b. Scope(org_units) = ORGU02
c. attType(org_units) = set
d. is_ordered(org_units) = True ; Horg_units = OUH
02
e. For each u ∈ USERSA, org_units(u) = φ ;
f. For each (u, orgu) ∈ UUA02,
org_units(u) = org_units(u) ∪ orgu
g. AATTA ← {aroles}
h. Scope(aroles) = AR02
i. attType(aroles) = set
j. is_ordered(aroles) = True ; Haroles ← ARH02
k. For each u ∈ AUA, aroles(u) = φ
l. For each (u, ar) in AUA02,
aroles(u) = aroles(u) ∪ ar
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in AURA */
a. assign_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can_assign02,
assign_formula' = assign_formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧
r ∈ Z ∧ (translate(cr)))
c. auth_assign =
is_authorizedUassign(au : AU
A, u : USERSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ assign_formula'
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule in AURA */
a. revoke_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can_revoke02,
revoke_formula' = revoke_formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z)
c. auth_revoke = ∀au ∈ AUA, ∀u ∈ USERSA, ∀r ∈
ROLESA.
is_authorizedUrevoke(au : AU
A, u : USERSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ revoke_formula'
Support routine for algorithm 3. translate02
Input: A URA02 prerequisite condition (cr),
Case 1, Case 2
Output: An equivalent sub-rule for AURA
authorization rule.
1: rule_string = φ
2: Case Of selection
3: ' Case 1 ' (cr is based on roles) :
4: translate97
5: ' Case 2 ' (cr is based on org_units):
6: For each symbol in cr
7: if symbol is an organization unit and in the
form x (i.e., the user is a member of
organization unit x)
8: rule_string = rule_string + (∃x' ≤ x). x'
∈ org_units(u)
9: else if symbol an organization unit and in the
form x¯ (i.e., the user is not a member of
organization unit x)
10: rule_string = rule_string + (∃x' ≤ x). x'
/∈ org_units(u)
11: else
12: rule_string = rule_string + symbol
/* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */
13: end if
14: end Case
End
cr2 is evaluated as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assginment,
(∃r ≥ r1). (u, r) ∈ UA ∨ ¬((∀r ≥ r2). (u, r) ∈ UA) ∧
(∃r ≥ r3). (u, r) ∈ UA
Case 2:
cr3 is evaluated as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assginment,
(∃x ≤ x1). (u, x) ∈ UUA ∧ (∃x ≤ x2). (u, x) ∈ UUA
cr4 is evaluated as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assginment,
(∃x ≤ x1). (u, x) ∈ UUA ∨ ¬((∀x ≤ x2). (u, x) ∈ UUA)
∧ (∃x ≤ x3). (u, x) ∈ UUA
can_assign and can_revoke for respective cases are as
follows:
Case 1:
can_assign = {(ar1, cr1, {r4, r5}), (ar1, cr2, {r6})}
can_revoke = {(ar1, {r1, r3, r4})}
Case 2:
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can_assign = {(ar1, cr3, {r4, r5}), (ar1, cr4, {r6})}
can_revoke = {(ar1, {r1, r3, r4})}
2) Equivalent URA02 Instance in AURA:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AOP = {assign, revoke}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4), (r4, r5), (r5, r6)}
• assigned_roles(u1) = {r1, r2},
assigned_roles(u2) = {r3, r4}
• UATT = {org_units}
• Scope(org_units) = {x1, x2, x3},
attType(org_units) = set
is_ordered(org_units) = True,
Horg_units = {(x3, x2), (x2, x1)}
• org_units(u1) = {x1}, org_units(u2) = {x3}
• AATT = {aroles}
• Scope(aroles) = {ar1, ar2},
attType(aroles) = set is_ordered(aroles) = True,
Haroles = {(ar1, ar2)}
• aroles(u3) = {ar1}, aroles(u4) = {ar2}
For each op in AOP, authorization rule for user to role
assignment and revocation can be expressed respectively,
as follows:
Case 1:
For any user u ∈ USERS, undertaken for assignment,
– is_authorizedUassign(au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES)
≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {r4, r5} ∧
((∃r ≥ r1). r ∈ assigned_roles(u) ∧ (∃r ≥ r2).
r ∈ assigned_roles(u))) ∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u)
∧ r ∈ {r6} ∧ ((∃r ≥ r1). r ∈ assigned_roles(u) ∨
(∃r ≥ r2). r /∈ assigned_roles(u) ∧ (∃r ≥ r3).
r ∈ assigned_roles(u)))
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for revocation,
– is_authorizedUrevoke(au : AU, u : USERS,
r : ROLES) ≡ (∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧
r ∈ {r1, r3, r4}
Case 2:
For any user u ∈ USERS, undertaken for assignment,
– is_authorizedUassign(au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES)
≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {r4, r5} ∧
((∃x ≤ x1). x ∈ org_units(u) ∧ (∃x ≤ x2).
x ∈ org_units(u))) ∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧
r ∈ {r6} ∧ ((∃x ≤ x1). x ∈ org_units(u) ∨ (∃x ≤ x2).
x /∈ org_units(u) ∧ (∃x ≤ x3). x ∈ org_units(u)))
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for revocation,
– is_authorizedUrevoke(au : AU, u : USERS,
r : ROLES) ≡ (∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧
r ∈ {r1, r3, r4}
3) MapURA02: Algorithm MapURA02 is an algorithm
for mapping a URA02 instance into equivalent AURA
instance. Sets and functions from URA02 and AURA
are marked with superscripts 02 and A, respec-
tively. MapURA02 takes URA02 instance as its in-
put. In particular, input for MapURA02 fundamentally
has USERS02, ROLES02, AR02, UA02, AUA02, RH02,
ARH02, can_assign02, can_revoke02, ORGU02, OUH02,
and UUA02.
Output from MapURA02 algorithm is an equivalent
AURA instance, with primarily consisting of following
sets and functions: USERSA, AUA, AOPA, ROLESA,
RHA, For each u ∈ USERSA, assigned_roles(u), UATTA,
AATTA, For each attribute att ∈ UATTA ∪ AATTA,
Scope(att), attType(att), is_ordered(att) and Hatt, For
each user u ∈ USERSA, aroles(u) and org_units(u),
Authorization rule for assign (auth_assign), and Autho-
rization rule to revoke (auth_revoke)
A shown in Algorithm MapURA02, there are four
main steps required in mapping any instance of URA02
model to AURA instance. In Step 1, sets and functions
from URA02 instance are mapped into AURA sets and
functions. In Step 2, user attributes and administrative
user attribute functions are expressed. UATT set has one
user attribute called org_units. This attribute captures a
regular user’s appointment or association in an organiza-
tion unit. There are two ways a user assignment decision
is made in URA02 which are marked as Case 1 and
Case 2 in the model. Case 1 checks for user’s existing
membership on roles while Case 2 checks for user’s
membership on organization units. org_units captures
Case 2. Case 1 is same as URA97. Admin user attribute
aroles captures admin roles assigned to admin users. Step
3 involves constructing assign_formula in AURA that is
equivalent to can_assign02 in URA02. can_assign02 is a
set of triples. Each triple bears information on whether
an admin role can assign a candidate user to a set of
roles. Equivalent translation in AURA for URA02 is
given by is_authorizedUassign(au : AU
A, u : USERSA, r
: ROLESA). Similarly, In Step 4, revoke_formula equiv-
alent to can_revoke02 is presented. A support routine
for MapURA02, translate02 translates prerequisite condi-
tion in URA02 into its equivalent in AURA. A com-
plete example instance and its corresponding equivalent
AURA instances were presented in Section IV-C1 and
Section IV-C2, respectively.
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D. Uni-ARBAC’s URA in AURA
In this section we present an example instance for
URA in Uni-ARBAC (URA-Uni) and its equivalent
AURA instance. We also present an algorithm that
translates any given URA-Uni instance to AURA
instance.
1) Uni-ARBAC’s URA Instance: This segment
presents an instance of URA in Uni-ARBAC model.
Sets and functions:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3)}
• UA = {(u3, r1), (u4, r3)}
user-pools sets and relations
• UPH = {(up2, up1)}
• UUPA = {(u1, up1), (u2, up2), (u3, up1), (u4, up2)}
Administrative Units and Partitioned Assignments
• AU = {au1, au2}
• roles(au1) = {r1, r2}, roles(au2) = {r3}
• user_pools(au1) = {up1}, user_pools(au2) = {up2}
Derived Function
• user_pools*(au1) = {up1}
• user_pools*(au2) = {up1, up2}
Administrative User Assignments
• UA_admin = {(u1, au1), (u2, au2)}
• AUH = {(au1, au2)}
User-role assignment condition in uni-ARBAC:
– can_manage_user_role(u1 : USERS, u2: USERS,
r: ROLES) = (∃aui, auj)[(u1, aui) ∈ UA_admin ∧ aui
au auj ∧ r ∈ roles(auj) ∧ (∃up ∈ UP)[(u2, up)
∈ UUPA ∧ up ∈ user_pools*(auj)]]
2) Equivalent AURA instance of URA in Uni-ARBAC:
This segment represents an equivalent AURA instance
for example instance presented in section IV-D1
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AOP = {assign, revoke}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3)}
• assigned_roles(u3) = {r1},
assigned_roles(u4) = {r3}
• UATT = {userpools, userpool_adminunit}
• Scope(userpools) = {up1, up2},
attType(userpools) = set,
is_ordered(userpools) = True,
Huserpools = {(up2, up1)}
• Scope(userpool_adminunit) = {(up1, au1),
(up2, au2)}, attType(userpool_adminunit) = set,
is_ordered(userpool_adminunit) = False,
Huserpool_adminunit = φ
• userpools(u1) = {up1, up2}, userpools(u2) = {up2},
userpools(u3) = {up1, up2}, userpools(u4) = {up2}
• userpool_adminunit(u1) = {(up1, au1), (up2, au2)},
userpool_adminunit(u2) = {(up2, au2)},
userpool_adminunit(u3) = {(up1, au1), (up2, au2)},
userpool_adminunit(u4) = {(up2, au2)}
• AATT = {admin_unit, adminunit_role}
• Scope(admin_unit) = {au1, au2},
attType(admin_unit) = set,
is_ordered(admin_unit) = True,
Hadmin_unit = {(au1, au2)}
• Scope(adminunit_role) = {(au1, r1), (au1, r2),
(au2, r3)},
attType(adminunit_role) = set,
is_ordered(adminunit_role) = False,
Hadminunit_role = φ
• admin_unit(u1) = {au1}, admin_unit(u2) = {au2},
admin_unit(u3) = {},
admin_unit(u4) = {}
• adminunit_role(u1) = {(au1, r1), (au1, r2),
(au2, r3)}, adminunit_role(u2) = {(au2, r3)},
adminunit_role(u3) = {}, adminunit_role(u4) = {}
For each op in AOP, authorization rule to aassign/revoke
a user to/from a role can be expressed as follows:
For any user u2 ∈ USERS undertaken for assignment,
– is_authorizedUassign(u1 : USERS, u2 : USERS,
r : ROLES) ≡
∃au1, au2 ∈ Scope(admin_unit). (au1, au2)
∈ Hadmin_unit ∧ (au1 ∈ admin_unit(u1) ∧ (au2, r) ∈
adminunit_role(u1)) ∧ ∃up1, up2 ∈ Scope(userpools).
(up2, up1) ∈ Huserpools ∧ ((up2, au2)
∈ userpool_adminunit(u2))
For any user u2 ∈ USERS undertaken for revocation,
– is_authorizedUrevoke(u1 : USERS, u2 : USERS,
r : ROLES) ≡ is_authorizedUassign(u1 : USERS,
u2 : USERS, r : ROLES)
3) MapURA-Uni-ARBAC: MapURA-Uni-ARBAC represents a
translation process of any instance of URA in Uni-
ARBAC to AURA instance. For clarity, basic sets from
URA in Uni-ARBAC are marked with superscript Uni
and basic sets from AURA are marked with superscript
A.
MapURA-Uni-ARBAC takes URA-Uni instance as in-
put. In particular in involves USERSUni, ROLESUni,
RHUni, UAUni, UPUni, UPHUni, UUPAUni, AUUni, For
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each au in AUUni, rolesUni(au), For each au in
AUUni, user_pools*(au), UA_adminUni, AUHUni, and
can_manage_user_role(u1 : USERS
Uni, u2 : USERS
Uni,
r : ROLESUni).
It yields an equivalent instance of AURA as USERSA,
AUA, AOPA, ROLESA, RHA, For each u ∈ USERSA,
assigned_roles(u), UATTA, AATTA, For each attribute
att ∈ UATTA ∪ AATTA, Scope(att), attType(att),
is_ordered(att) and Hatt, For each user u ∈ USERSA, and
for each att ∈ UATTA ∪ AATTA, att(u), Authorization
rule for assign (auth_assign), and Authorization rule for
revoke (auth_revoke).
A shown in Algorithm MapURA-Uni-ARBAC, there are
four main steps required in mapping any instance of
URA-Uni model to AURA instance. In Step 1, sets
and functions from URA-Uni instance are mapped
into AURA sets and functions. In Step 2, user at-
tributes and administrative user attribute functions are
expressed. There are two user attribute, userpools and
userpool_adminunit. userpools captures regular user’s
binding with a group called user-pools. Regular user
attribute userpool_adminunit provides regular user’s as-
sociation with user-pools, and for each user-pool a user is
associated with, user-pool’s mapping with admin unit. As
a result, this attribute captures a regular user’s association
with an admin unit. We note that we need both the
attributes. Although userpool_adminunit captures regular
user’s association with user-pools and corresponding
admin units, it cannot capture user association with user-
pools which may not have admin unit associated with
it. It is the user-pools that are mapped to admin units.
There are two admin user attributes, admin_unit and ad-
minunit_role. admin_unit captures UA_admin relation in
Uni-ARBAC, and adminunit_role captures admin user’s
mapping with admin unit and for each admin unit an
admin user is mapped to, admin unit’s associated roles.
The notion of Uni-ARBAC model is that an admin
user to have admin authority (given by UA_admin re-
lation) to assign/revoke regular user and role, if both
regular user and role are mapped to that admin unit
where admin user has admin authority.
Step 3 involves constructing auth_assign in AURA
that is equivalent to can_manage_user_role(u1 :
USERSUni, u2 : USERS
Uni, r : ROLESUni) in
URA-Uni. Its translation in AURA is given by
is_authorizedUassign(au : AU
A, u : USERSA, r :
ROLESA). Similarly, In Step 4, authorization rule to
revoke user-role (auth_revoke), which is equivalent to
can_manage_user_role(u1 : USERS
Uni, u2 : USERS
Uni,
r : ROLESUni) is expressed.
Algorithm 4. MapURA-Uni-ARBAC
Input: Instance of URA in Uni-ARBAC
Output: AURA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in AURA */
a. USERSA ← USERSUni ; AUA ← USERSUni ;
b. AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
c. ROLESA ← ROLESUni
d. RHA ← RHUni ; For each u ∈ USERSA,
assigned_roles(u) = φ
e. For each (u, r) ∈ UAUni, assigned_roles(u)' =
assigned_roles(u) ∪ r
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in AURA */
a. UATTA ← {userpools, userpool_adminunit}
b. Scope(userpools) = UPUni
c. attType(userpools) = set
d. is_ordered(userpools) = True
e. Huserpools = UPH
Uni
f. For each u in USERSA, userpools(u) = φ
g. For each (u, up) ∈ UUPAUni,
userpools(u)' = userpools(u) ∪ up
h. Scope(userpool_adminunit) =
USERSUni × AUUni
i. attType(userpool_adminunit) = set
j. is_ordered(userpool_adminunit) = False
k. Huserpool_adminunit
l. For each u in USERSA,
userpool_adminunit(u) = φ ;
m. For each (u, up) ∈ UUPAUni
and for each au in AUUni,
if up ∈ user_pools(au) then
userpool_adminunit(u)' =
userpool_adminunit(u) ∪ (up, au)
n. AATTA ← {admin_unit, adminunit_role}
o. Scope(admin_unit) = AUUni
p. attType(admin_unit) = set
q. is_ordered(admin_unit) = True
r. Hadmin_unit = AUH
Uni
s. For each u in AUA, admin_unit(u) = φ
t. For each (u, au) ∈ UA_adminUni,
admin_unit(u)' = admin_unit(u) ∪ au
u. Scope(adminunit_role) = AUUni × ROLESUni
v. attType(adminunit_role) = set
w. is_ordered(adminunit_role) = False
x. For each u in AUA, adminunit_role(u) = φ
y. For each (u, au) ∈ UA_adminUni
and for each r ∈ rolesUni(au),
adminunit_role(u)' = adminunit_role(u) ∪ (au, r)
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Continuation of Algorithm 4. MapURA-Uni-ARBAC
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in AURA */
a. can_manage_rule =
(∃au1, au2 ∈ Scope(admin_unit). (au1, au2)
∈ Hadmin_unit ∧ (au1 ∈ admin_unit(u1) ∧
(au2, r) ∈ adminunit_role(u1)) ∧ ∃up1, up2
∈ Scope(userpools). (up2, up1) ∈ Huserpools ∧
(up2, au2) ∈ userpool_adminunit(u2))
b. auth_assign =
– is_authorizedUassign(u1 : AU
A, u2 : USERS
A,
r : ROLESA) ≡ can_manage_rule
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for AURA */
a. auth_revoke =
– is_authorizedUrevoke(u1 : AU
A, u2 : USERS
A,
r : ROLESA) ≡ can_manage_rule
E. UARBAC’s URA in AURA
Li and Mao [8] redefine RBAC model. They propose
a notion of class of objects in RBAC. A summary is
presented here.
1) RBAC Model: RBAC model has following schema.
RBAC Schema:
RBAC Schemas is given by following tuple.
<C, OBJS, AM>
• C is a finite set of object classes with predefined
classes: user and role.
• OBJS(c) is a function that gives all possible names
for objects of the class c ∈ C. Let
USERS = OBJS(user) and ROLES = OBJS(role)
• AM(c) is function that maps class c to a set of access
modes that can be applied on objects of class c.
Access modes for two predefined classes user and role
are fixed by the model and are as follows:
AM(user) = {empower, admin}
AM(role) = {grant, empower, admin}
RBAC Permissions:
There are two kinds of permissions in this RBAC model:
1) Object permissions of the form,
[c, o, a], where c ∈ C, o ∈ OBJS(c), a ∈ AM(c).
2) Class permissions of the form,
[c, a], where, c ∈ C, and a ∈ {create} ∪ AM(c).
RBAC State:
Given an RBAC Schema, an RBAC state is given by,
<OB, UA, PA, RH>
• OB is a function that maps each class in C to a
finite set of object names of that class that currently
exists, i.e., OB(c) ⊆ OBJS(c). Let
OB(user) = USERS, and OB(role) = ROLES.
Set of permissions, P, is given by
P = {[c, o, a] | c ∈ C ∧ o ∈ OBJS(c) ∧ a ∈ AM(c)}
∪ {[c, a] | c ∈ C ∧ a ∈ {create} ∪ AM(c)}
• UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, user-role assignment
relation.
• PA ⊆ P × ROLES, permission-role assignment
relation.
• RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, partial order in ROLES
denoted by RH.
Administrative permissions in UARBAC:
All the permissions of user u who performs administra-
tive operations can be calculated as follows:
• authorized_perms[u] = {p ∈ P | ∃r1, r2 ∈ R [(u, r1)
∈ UA ∧ (r1 RH r2) ∧ (r2, p) ∈ PA]}
User-Role Administration
Operations required to assign user u1 to role r1 and to
revoke u1 from role r1 are respectively listed below:
• grantRoleToUser(r1, u1)
• revokeRoleFromUser(r1, u1)
A user at least requires following two permissions to
conduct grantRoleToUser(r1, u1) operation.
1) [user, u1, empower]
2) [role, r1, empower]
A user at least requires one of the following (three) op-
tions to conduct revokeRoleFromUser(r1, u1) operation.
1) [user, u1, empower] and [role, r1, empower]
2) [user, u1, admin]
3) [role, r1, admin]
2) Instance of URA in UARBAC:
RBAC Schema
• C = {user, role}
• OBJS(user) = USERS, OBJS(role) = ROLES
• AM(user) = {empower, admin}, AM(role) =
{grant, empower, admin}
RBAC State
• USERS = OBJ(user) = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = OBJ(role)= {r1, r2, r3, r4}
• P = {[user, u1, empower], [user, u1, admin],
[user, u2, empower], [user, u2, admin], [user,
u3, empower], [user, u3, admin], [user, u4, em-
power], [user, u4, admin], [role, r1, grant], [role,
r1, empower], [role, r1, admin], [role, r2, grant],
[role, r2, empower], [role, r2, admin], [role, r3,
grant], [role, r3, empower], [role, r3, admin],
[role, r4, grant], [role, r4, empower], [role, r4,
admin], [user, empower], [user, admin], [role,
empower], [role, grant], [role, admin]}
15
• UA = {(u1, r1), (u2, r1), (u2, r2), (u2, r3), (u3, r3),
(u4, r2)}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4)}
Administrative permissions of UARBAC’s URA:
Following is the list of administrative permissions each
user has for user-role assignment:
• authorized_perms[u1] = {[user, u1, empower],
[role, r1, grant], [user, u2, empower], [role,
r3, grant], [user, u3, empower], [user, u4, em-
power], [role, r2, grant], [user, u3, admin], [role,
r1, admin], [role, r4, admin]}
• authorized_perms[u2] = {[user, u1, empower],
[role, r1, grant], [user, u2, empower], [role, r2,
grant]}
• authorized_perms[u3] = {}
• authorized_perms[u4] = {[role, grant], [user, em-
power]}
User-Role assignment condition in URA-UARBAC:
One can perform following operation to assign a user u1
to a role r1.
• grantRoleToUser(r1, u1)
To perform aforementioned operation one needs the
following two permissions:
• [user, u2, empower] and [role, r1, grant]
Condition for revoking user-role in URA-UARBAC:
One can perform following operation to revoke a user
u1 to a role r1.
• revokeRoleFromUser(r1, u1)
To perform aforementioned operation one needs the one
of the following permissions:
• [user, u1, empower] and [role, r1, grant] or,
• [role, r1, admin] or,
• [user, u1, admin]
3) Equivalent AURA instance for URA in UARBAC:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AOP = {assign, revoke}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4)}
• assigned_roles(u1) = {r1},
assigned_roles(u2) = {r1, r2, r3},
assigned_roles(u3) = {r3},
assigned_roles(u4) = {r2}
• UATT = {}
• AATT = {user_am, role_am, classp}
• Scope(user_am) = {(u1, empower),
(u2, empower), (u3, empower),
(u3, admin), (u4, empower)},
attType(user_am) = set,
is_ordered(user_am) = False, Huser_am = φ
• Scope(role_am) = {(r1, grant), (r2, grant),
(r3, grant), (r1, admin), (r4, admin)},
attType(role_am) = set,
is_ordered(role_am) = False, Hrole_am = φ
• Scope(classp) = {(user, empower), (user, admin),
(role, empower), (user, grant), (role, admin)},
attType(classp) = set, is_ordered(user_am) = False,
Hclassp = φ
• user_am(u1) = {(u1, empower), (u2, empower),
(u3, empower), (u4, empower), (u3, admin)},
user_am(u2) = {(u1, empower), (u2, empower)},
user_am(u3) = {}, user_am(u4) = {}
• role_am(u1) = {(r1, grant), (r2, grant), (r3, grant),
(r1, admin), (r4, admin)},
role_am(u2) = {(r1, grant), (r2, grant)},
role_am(u3) = {}, role_am(u4) = {}
• classp(u1) = {}, classp(u2) = {}, classp(u3) = {},
classp(u4) = {(role, grant), (user, empower)}
For each op in AOP, authorization rule to assign/revoke
user-role can be expressed as follows:
For any regular user u2 ∈ USERS taken for assignment,
– is_authorizedUassign(u1 : USERS, u2 : USERS,
r1 : ROLES) ≡
((u2, empower) ∈ user_am(u1) ∧ (r1, grant)
∈ role_am(u1)) ∨ ((u2, empower) ∈ user_am(u1) ∧
(role, grant) ∈ classp(u1)) ∨ ((user, empower)
∈ classp(u1) ∧ (r1, grant) ∈ role_am(u1)) ∨
((user, empower) ∈ classp(u1) ∧
(role, grant) ∈ classp(u1))
For any regular user u2 ∈ USERS taken for revocation,
– is_authorizedUrevoke(u1 : USERS, u2 : USERS,
r1 : ROLES) ≡
((u2, empower) ∈ user_am(u1) ∧ (r1, grant)
∈ role_am(u1)) ∨ (u2, admin) ∈ user_am(u1) ∨
(r1, admin) ∈ role_am(u1) ∨ (user, admin)
∈ classp(u1) ∨ (role, admin) ∈ classp(u1)
4) MapURA-UARBAC: MapURA-UARBAC is an algorithm
that maps any instance of URA in UARBAC [8] (URA-
U) to its equivalent AURA instance. For clarity, sets
and function from UARBAC model are labeled with
superscript U, and that of AURA with superscript
A. Input to MapURA-UARBAC consists of C
U, USERSU,
ROLESU, UAU, RH U, AM U(user), AM U(role), For each
u ∈ USERSU, authorized_permsU[u],
For each u1 ∈ USERSU and for each r1 ∈ ROLESU,
grantRoleToUser(u1, r1) is true if the granter has one of
the following combinations of permissions:
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Algorithm 5. MapURA-UARBAC
Input: Instance of URA in UARBAC
Output: AURA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in AURA */
a. USERSA ← USERSU ; AUA ← USERSU
b. AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
c. ROLESA ← ROLESU ; RHA ← RH U
d. For each u1 ∈ USERSA, assigned_rolesA(u1) = φ
e. For each (u1, r1) ∈ UAU,
assigned_rolesA(u1)' = assigned_roles
A(u1) ∪ r1
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in AURA */
a. UATTA = φ ;
b. AATTA ← {user_am, role_am, classp}
c. ScopeA(user_am) = USERSU × AM U(user)
d. attTypeA(user_am) = set
e. is_orderedA(user_am) = False, HAuser_am = φ
f. For each u in AUU, user_am(u) = φ
g. For each u in U U and
for each [c, u1, am] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
user_am(u)' = user_am(u) ∪ (u1, am)
h. ScopeA(role_am) = ROLESU × AM U(role)
i. attTypeA(role_am) = set
j. is_orderedA(role_am) = False, HArole_am = φ
k. For each u in USERSA, role_am(u) = φ
l. For each u in U U
for each [c, r1, am] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
role_am(u)' = role_am(u) ∪ (r1, am)
m. ScopeA(classp) =
C U × {AM(role)U ∪ AM U(user)}
n. attTypeA(classp) = set
o. is_orderedA(classp) = False, HAclassp = φ
p. For each u in USERSA, classp(u) = φ
q. For each u in U U
for each [c, a] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
classp(u)'= classp(u) ∪ (c, a)
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in AURA */
a. assign_formula =
((u2, empower) ∈ user_am(u1) ∧ (r1, grant)
∈ role_am(u1)) ∨ ((u2, empower) ∈ user_am(u1)
∧ (role, grant) ∈ classp(u1)) ∨ ((user, empower)
∈ classp(u1) ∧ (r1, grant) ∈ role_am(u1)) ∨
((user, empower) ∈ classp(u1) ∧
(role, grant) ∈ classp(u1))
b. auth_assign =
is_authorizedUassign(u1 : USERS
A, u2 : USERS
A,
r1 : ROLESA) ≡ assign_formula
Continuation of Algorithm 5. MapURA-UARBAC
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for AURA */
a. revoke_formula =
((u2, empower) ∈ user_am(u1) ∧ (r1, grant)
∈ role_am(u1)) ∨ (u2, admin) ∈ user_am(u1) ∨
(r1, admin) ∈ role_am(u1) ∨ (user, admin)
∈ classp(u1) ∨ (role, admin) ∈ classp(u1)
b. auth_revoke =
is_authorizedUrevoke(u1 : USERS
A, u2 : USERS
A,
r1 : ROLESA) ≡ revoke_formula
• [user, u1, empower] and [role, r1, grant], or
• [user, u1, empower] and [role, grant], or
• [user, empower] and [role, r1, grant], or
• [user, empower] and [role, grant],
For each u1 ∈ USERSU and for each r1 ∈ ROLESU,
revokeRoleFromUser(u1, r1) is true if the granter has
either of the following permissions :
• [user, u1, empower] and [role, r1, grant] or,
• [user, u1, admin] or,
• [role, r1, admin] or,
• [user, admin] or,
• [role, admin]
Output from MapURA-UARBAC is an AURA instance with
primarily following sets and functions: USERSA, AUA,
AOPA, ROLESA, RHA, For each u ∈ USERSA, roles(u),
UATTA, AATTA, For each attribute att ∈ UATTA ∪
AATTA, ScopeA(att), attTypeA(att), is_orderedA(att) and
HAatt, For each user u ∈ USERSA, and for each
att ∈ UATTA ∪ AATTA, att(u), Authorization rule
for assign (auth_assign), Authorization rule for revoke
(auth_revoke))
There are four primary steps in translating a URA-U
instance to AURA instance. Step 1 in MapURA-UARBAC
involves translating sets and functions from URA-U
to AURA equivalent sets and functions. In Step 2,
user attributes and admin user attributes functions are
defined. Regular user attributes (UATT) is set to null
as there is no regular user attributes required. An
admin user’s authority towards a regular user and a
role, defined by access modes, decides whether she can
assign that user to role. AURA defines three admin
user attributes: user_am, role_am and classp. user_am
attribute captures an admin user’s access mode towards
a particular regular user. Similarly, role_am captures an
admin user’s access mode towards a particular role. An
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admin user can also have a class level access mode
captured by attribute classp. With class level access
mode, an admin user gains authority over an entire class
of object. For example [grant, role] admin permission
provides an admin user with power to grant any role. In
Step 3, assign_formula equal to is_authorizedUassign(u1
: USERSA, u2 : USERS
A, r1 : ROLESA) for AURA
that is equivalent to grantRoleToUser(u1, r1) in URA-
U is established. Similarly, in Step 4 revoke_formula
equivalent to revokeRoleFromUser(u1, r1) is constructed.
V. MAPPING PRIOR PRA MODELS IN ARPA
In this section, we demonstrate that ARPA can in-
tuitively simulate the features of prior PRA models. In
particular, we have developed concrete algorithms that
can convert any instance of PRA97, PRA99, PRA02,
the PRA model in UARBAC, and the PRA model in
Uni-ARBAC into an equivalent instance of ARPA. The
following sections also present example instances of
each of the prior PRA models and their corresponding
instances in AURA/ARPA model followed by a formal
mapping alorithms.
A. PRA97 in ARPA
In this section, we present an example instance for
PRA97 followed by an equivalent ARPA instance. We
also present an algorithm that translates any instance of
PRA97 into corresponding equivalent ARPA instance.
1) PRA97 Instance: In this section we present an
example instance for PRA97. The sets are as follows:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}
• AR = {ar1, ar2}
• PERMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
• AUA = {(u1, ar1), (u3, ar2)}
• PA = {(p1, r1), (p2, r2), (p2, r4), (p3, r3), (p4, r3),
(p4, r4)}
• RH = {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x4), (x4, x5), (x5, x6)}
• ARH = {(ar1, ar2)}
• CR = {x1 ∧ x2, x¯1 ∨ x3}
Let cr1 = x1 ∧ x2 and, cr2 = x¯1 ∨ x3.
Prerequisite condition cr1 is evaluated as follows:
For each p that is undertaken for assignment,
(∃x ≤ x1)(p, x) ∈ PA ∧ (∃x ≤ x2)(p, x) ∈ PA
cr2 is evaluated as follows:
For each p that is undertaken for assignment,
(∃x ≤ x1)(p, x) /∈ PA ∨ (∃x ≤ x3)(p, x) ∈ PA
Let can_assignp and can_revokep be as follows:
can_assignp = {(ar1, cr1, {x4, x5}), (ar1, cr2, {x6})}
can_revokep = {(ar1, ROLES)}
2) Equivalent Example Instance of ARPA for PRA97:
This section presents an equivalent ARPA instance
for the aforementioned PRA97 example instance.
Set and functions:
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AOP = {assign, revoke}
• ROLES = {x1, x2, x3 x4, x5, x6}
• RH = {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x4), (x5, x6)}
• PERMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
• AATT = {aroles}
• Scope(aroles) = {ar1, ar2}
attType(aroles) = set, is_ordered(aroles) = True,
Haroles = {(ar1, ar2)}
• aroles(u1) = {ar1}, aroles(u2) = {},
aroles(u3) = {ar2}, aroles(u4) = {}
• PATT = {rolesp}
• Scope(rolesp) = ROLES, attType(rolesp) = set,
• is_ordered(rolesp) = True, Hrolesp = RH
• rolesp(p1) = {r1}, rolesp(p2) = {r2, r4},
rolesp(p3) = {r3}, rolesp(p4) = {r3, r4}
Authorization rule for user-role assignment can be ex-
pressed as follows:
For any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for assign-
ment,
– is_authorizedPassign(au : AU
A, p : PERMSA, r :
ROLESA) ≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {x4, x5} ∧
(∃x ≤ x1). x ∈ rolesp(p) ∧ (∃x ≤ x2). x ∈ rolesp(p) ∨
(∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {x6} ∧
(∃x ≤ x1). x /∈ rolesp(p) ∨ (∃x ≤ x3). x ∈ rolesp(p)
Authorization rule to revoke a permission from a role
can be expressed as follows:
For any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for
revocation,
– is_authorizedPrevoke(au : AU
A, p : PERMSA, r :
ROLESA)
≡ (∃ar ≤ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ ROLES
3) MapPRA97: Algorithm 6 presents MapPRA97, which
is an algorithm for mapping any PRA97 instance into
equivalent ARPA instance. Sets and functions from
PRA97 and ARPA are marked with superscripts 97 and
A, respectively. MapPRA97 takes PRA97 instance as its
input. In particular, input for MapPRA97 fundamentally
has USERS97, ROLES97, AR97, PERMS97, AUA97, PA97,
RH97, ARH97, can_assignp97, and can_revokep97
Output from MapPRA97 algorithm is an equivalent
ARPA instance, with primarily consisting of AUA,
18
AOPA, ROLESA, RHA, PERMSA, AATTA, PATTA, For
each attribute att ∈ AATTA ∪ PATTA, ScopeA(att),
attTypeA(att), is_orderedA(att) and HAatt, For each user
u ∈ AUA, and for each att ∈ AATTA, att(u), For
each permission p ∈ PERMSA, and for each att ∈
PATTA, att(p), Authorization rule for permission assign
(auth_assign), and Authorization rule for permission
revoke (auth_revoke)
As indicated in MapPRA97, there are four main steps
for mapping. In Step 1, sets and functions from PRA97
are mapped into ARPA sets and functions. In Step 2,
permission attributes and administrative user attribute
functions are expressed. There exists one permission
attribute called rolesp. It captures association between
a roles and assigned permissions. Admin user attribute
aroles captures the association between admin users
and admin roles in PRA97. Step 3 involves con-
structing assign_formula in ARPA that is equivalent to
can_assignp97. can_assignp97 is a set of triples. Each
triple bears information on whether an admin role can
assign a candidate permission to a set of roles.
Equivalent translation equivalent to can_assignp97 in
ARPA is given by is_authorizedPassign(au : AU
A, p
: PERMSA, r : ROLESA). Similarly, In Step 4, re-
voke_formula equivalent to can_revokep97 is presented.
A support routine translatep97 translates prerequisite
condition.
B. PRA99 in ARPA
1) PRA99 Instance: In this section, an exam-
ple instance of the PRA99 model is presented.
Sets and functions:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}
• AR = {ar1, ar2}
• PERMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
• AUA = {(u3, ar1), (u4, ar2)}
• PA = {(p1, Mx1), (p2, IMx3), (p3, IMx2), (p4, Mx4)}
• RH = {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x4), (x4, x5), (x5, x6)}
• ARH = {(ar1, ar2)}
• CR = {x2, x¯1}
Let cr1 = x2 and, cr2 = x¯1.
Prerequisite condition cr1 is evaluated as follows:
For each p that is undertaken for assignment,
((p, Mx2) ∈ PA ∨ ((∃x' ≤ x2). (p, Mx') ∈ PA) ∧
(p, IMx2) /∈ PA)
cr2 is evaluated as follows:
For each p that is undertaken for assignment,
(p, Mx1) /∈ PA ∧ ((∃x' ≤ x1). (p, Mx') /∈ PA) ∧ (p, IMx1)
/∈ PA ∧ ((∃x' ≤ x1). (p, IMx') /∈ PA)
Algorithm 6. MapPRA97
Input: PRA97 instance
Output: ARPA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in ARPA */
a. AUA ← USERS97 ; AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
b. ROLESA ← ROLES97 ; RHA ← RH97
c. PERMSA ← PERMS97
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in ARPA */
a. AATTA ← {aroles}
b. ScopeA(aroles) = AR97 ; attTypeA(aroles) = set
c. is_orderedA(aroles) = True ; HAaroles ← ARH97
d. For each u ∈ AUA, aroles(u) = φ
e. For each (u, ar) in AUA97,
aroles(u)' = aroles(u) ∪ ar
f. PATTA ← {rolesp}
g. ScopeA(rolesp) = ROLESA
h. attTypeA(rolesp) = set
i. is_orderedA(rolesp) = True ; HArolesp ← RHA
j. For each p in PERMSA, rolesp(u) = φ
k. For each (p, r) in PA97, rolesp(p)'= rolesp(p) ∪ r
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in ARPA */
a. assign_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can_assignp97,
assign_formula' = assign_formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧
(translatep97(cr)))
c. auth_assign =
is_authorizedPassign(au : AU
A, p : PERMSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ assign_formula'
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for ARPA */
a. revoke_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can_revokep97
revoke_formula' = revoke_formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z)
c. auth_revoke =
is_authorizedPassign(au : AU
A, p : PERMSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ assign_formula'
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Support routine for algorithm 6. translatep97
Input: A PRA97 prerequisite condition, cr
Output: An equivalent sub-rule for ARPA authorization
assign rule.
1: rule_string = φ
2: For each symbol in cr,
3: if symbol is a role and in the form x
(i.e., the permission has membership on role x)
4: rule_string' = rule_string + (∃x' ≤ x). x'
∈ rolesp(p)
5: else if symbol is a role and in the form x¯
(i.e., the permission doesn’t have membership
on role x)
6: rule_string' = rule_string + (∃x' ≤ x). x'
/∈ rolesp(p)
7: else
8: rule_string' = rule_string + symbol
/* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */
9: end if
Let can-assignp-M and can-assignp-IM in PRA99 be as
follows:
can-assignp-M = {(ar1, cr1, {x4, x5})}
can-assignp-IM= {(ar1, cr2, {x3})}
For simplicity, same prerequisite conditions are consid-
ered for grant and revoke model instances. Prerequisite
conditions for PRA99 revoke model are evaluated as
follows:
cr1 is evaluated as follows:
((p, Mx2) ∈ PA ∨ (p, IMx2) ∈ PA ∨ ((∃x' ≤ x2).
(p, Mx') ∈ PA) ∨ ((∃x' ≤ x2). (p, IMx') ∈ PA))
cr2 is evaluated as follows:
(p, Mx1) /∈ PA ∧ (p, IMx1) /∈ PA ∧ ((∃x' ≤ x1).
(p, Mx') /∈ PA) ∧ ((∃x' ≤ x1). (p, IMx') /∈ PA)
Let can-revokep-M and can-revokep-IM sets be as fol-
lows:
can-revokep-M = {(ar1, cr1, {x3, x4, x5})}
can-revokep-IM= {(ar1, cr2, {x5, x6})}
2) Equivalent PRA99 Instance in ARPA: This section
presents an equivalent ARPA instance for the aforemen-
tioned PRA99 example instance.
Sets and functions:
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
Algorithm 7. MapPRA99
Input: PRA99 instance
Output: ARPA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in ARPA */
a. AUA ← USERS99
b. AOPA ← {mob-assign, mob-revoke, immob-
assign, immob-revoke}
c. ROLESA ← ROLES99 ; RHA ← RH99
d. PERMSA ← PERMS99
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in ARPA */
a. AATTA ← {aroles} ; ScopeA(aroles) = AR99
b. attTypeA(aroles) = set ; is_orderedA(aroles) =
True
c. HAaroles ← ARH99 ; For each u ∈ AUA,
aroles(u) = φ
d. For each (u, ar) in AUA99,
aroles(u) = aroles(u) ∪ ar
e. PATTA ← {exp_mob_mem, imp_mob_mem,
exp_immob_mem, imp_immob_mem}
f. ScopeA(exp_mob_mem) = ROLESA
g. attTypeA(exp_mob_mem) = set
h. is_orderedA(exp_mob_mem) = True
i. HAexp_mob_mem ← RHA ; For each p in PERMSA,
exp_mob_mem(p) = φ
j. For each (p, Mr) in PA99,
exp_mob_mem(p)'= exp_mob_mem(p) ∪ r
k. ScopeA(imp_mob_mem) = ROLESA
l. attTypeA(imp_mob_mem) = set
m. is_orderedA(imp_mob_mem) = True
n. HAimp_mob_mem ← RHA
o. For each p in PERMSA, imp_mob_mem(p) = φ
p. For each (p, Mr) in PA99
and for each role r' > r,
imp_mob_mem(p)'= imp_mob_mem(p) ∪ r'
q. ScopeA(exp_immob_mem) = ROLESA
r. attTypeA(exp_immob_mem) = set
s. is_orderedA(exp_immob_mem) = True
t. HAexp_immob_mem ← RHA ; For each p in PERMSA,
exp_immob_mem(p) = φ ;
u. For each (p, IMr) in PA99,
exp_immob_mem(p)'= exp_immob_mem(p) ∪ r
v. ScopeA(imp_immob_mem) = ROLESA
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Continuation of Algorithm 7. MapPRA99
w. attTypeA(imp_immob_mem) = set
x. is_orderedA(imp_immob_mem) = True
y. HAimp_immob_mem ← RHA ; For each p in PERMSA,
imp_immob_mem(p) = φ
z. For each (p, IMr) in PA99
and for each role r' > r,
imp_immob_mem(p)'= imp_immob_mem(p) ∪ r'
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in ARPA */
a. assign-mob-formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-assignp-M99,
assign-mob-formula' = assign-mob-formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧
(translatep99(cr, mob-assign)))
c. auth_mob_assign =
is_authorizedPmob-assign(au : AU
A, p : PERMSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ assign-mob-formula'
d. assign-immob-formula = φ
e. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-assignp-IM99,
assign-immob-formula' = assign-immob-formula
∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧
(translatep99(cr, immob-assign)))
f. auth_immob_assign =
is_authorizedPimmob-assign(au : AU
A, p :
PERMSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ assign-immob-formula'
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule in ARPA */
a. revoke-mob-formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-revokep-M99,
revoke-mob-formula' = revoke-mob-formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧
(translatep99(cr, mob-revoke)))
c. auth_mob_revoke =
is_authorizedPmob-revoke(au : AU
A, p : PERMSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ revoke-mob-formula'
d. revoke-immob-formula = φ
e. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-revokep-IM99,
revoke-immob-formula' = revoke-immob-formula
∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧
(translatep99(cr, immob-revoke)))
f. auth_immob_revoke =
is_authorizedPimmob-revoke(au : AU
A, p :
PERMSA,
r : ROLESA) ≡ revoke-immob-formula'
Support routine for algorithm 7. translatep99
Input: A PRA99 prerequisite condition (cr),
op ∈ {mob-assign, immob-assign, mob-revoke,
immob-revoke}
Output: An equivalent sub-rule for AURA authorization
assign rule.
1: rule_string = φ
2: For each symbol in cr
3: if op = (mob-assign ∨ immob-assign) ∧ symbol
is a role and in the form x
(i.e., the permission has membership on role x)
4: rule_string = rule_string + (x ∈
exp_mob_mem(p) ∨ (x ∈ imp_mob_mem(p)
∧ x /∈ exp_immob_mem(p))
else if op = (mob-revoke ∨ immob-revoke) ∧
symbol is a role and in the form x
(i.e., the permission has membership on role x)
5: rule_string = rule_string + (x ∈
exp_mob_mem(p) ∨ x ∈ imp_mob_mem(p)
∨ x ∈ exp_immob_mem(p)
∨ x ∈ imp_immob_mem(p))
6: else if op = (mob-assign ∨ immob-assign ∨
mob-revoke ∨ immob-revoke) ∧
symbol is role and in the form x¯
(i.e., the permission doesn’t have membership
on role x)
7: rule_string = rule_string + (x /∈
exp_mob_mem(p) ∧ x /∈ imp_mob_mem(p) ∧
x /∈ exp_immob_mem(p) ∧
x /∈ imp_immob_mem(p))
8: else
9: rule_string = rule_string + symbol
/* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */
10: end if
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• AOP = {mob-assign, immob-assign,
mob-revoke, immob-revoke}
• ROLES = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}
• RH = {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x3, x4), (x4, x5), (x5, x6)}
• PERMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
• AATT = {aroles}
• Scope(aroles) = {ar1, ar2}, attType(aroles) = set,
is_ordered(aroles) = True, Haroles = {(ar1, ar2)}
• aroles(u1) = {}, aroles(u2) = {},
aroles(u3) = {ar1}, aroles(u4) = {ar2}
• PATT= {exp_mob_mem, imp_mob_mem,
exp_immob_mem, imp_immob_mem}
• Scope(exp_mob_mem) = ROLES,
attType(exp_mob_mem) = set,
is_ordered(exp_mob_mem) = True,
Hexp_mob_mem = RH
• exp_mob_mem(p1) = {x1}, exp_mob_mem(p2) = {},
exp_mob_mem(p3) = {}, exp_mob_mem(p4) = {x4},
• Scope(imp_mob_mem)= ROLES,
attType(imp_mob_mem) = set
is_ordered(imp_mob_mem) = True,
Himp_mob_mem = RH
• imp_mob_mem(p1) = {}, imp_mob_mem(p2) = {},
imp_mob_mem(p3) = {},
imp_mob_mem(p4) = {x1, x2, x3}
• Scope(exp_immob_mem) = ROLES,
attType(exp_immob_mem) = set
is_ordered(exp_immob_mem) = True,
Hexp_immob_mem = RH
• exp_immob_mem(p1) = {},
exp_immob_mem(p2) = {x3},
exp_immob_mem(p3) = {x2},
exp_immob_mem(p4) = {},
• Scope(imp_immob_mem) = ROLES,
attType(imp_immob_mem) = set
• is_ordered(imp_immob_mem) = True,
Himp_immob_mem = RH
• imp_immob_mem(p1) = {},
imp_immob_mem(p2) = {x1, x2},
imp_immob_mem(p3) = {x1},
imp_immob_mem(p4) = {}
Authorization rule to assign a permission as a mobile
member of a role can be expressed as follows:
To assigning any permission p ∈ PERMS as a mobile
member,
– is_authorizedPmob-assign(au : AU, p : PERMS,
r : ROLES) ≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x4, x5} ∧
(x2 ∈ exp_mob_mem(p) ∨ (x2 ∈ imp_mob_mem(p) ∧
x2 /∈ exp_immob_mem(p)))
Authorization rule to revoke a mobile permission from
a role can be expressed as follows:
To revoke any mobile permission p ∈ PERMS from a
role,
– is_authorizedPmob-revoke(au : AU, p : PERMS,
r : ROLES) ≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x3, x4, x5} ∧
(x2 ∈ exp_mob_mem(p) ∨ x2 ∈ imp_mob_mem(p) ∨
x2 ∈ exp_immob_mem(p) ∨ x2 ∈ imp_immob_mem))
Authorization functions to assign any permission p ∈
PERMS as an immobile member of role can be expressed
as follows:
To assign any permission p ∈ PERMS as a immobile
member,
– is_authorizedPimmob-assign(au : AU, p : PERMS,
r : ROLES) ≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧
r ∈ {x3} ∧ (x1 /∈ exp_mob_mem(p) ∧
x1 /∈ imp_mob_mem(p) ∧ x1 /∈ exp_immob_mem(p) ∧
x1 /∈ imp_immob_mem(p)))
Authorization rule to revoke any immobile permission
from a role can be expressed as follows:
To revoke any immobile permission p ∈ PERMS from
a role,
– is_authorizedPimmob-revoke(au : AU, p : PERMS,
r : ROLES) ≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(p) ∧ r ∈ {x5, x6} ∧
x1 /∈ exp_mob_mem(p) ∧ x1 /∈ imp_mob_mem(p) ∧
x1 /∈ exp_immob_mem(p) ∧ x1 /∈ imp_immob_mem(p))
3) MapPRA99: Algorithm 7 is an algorithm for map-
ping any PRA99 instance into equivalent ARPA instance.
Sets and functions from PRA99 and ARPA are marked
with textsuperscripts 99 and A, respectively. MapPRA99
takes PRA99 instance as its input. In particular, input
for MapPRA99 fundamentally has USERS
99, PERMS99,
ROLES99, AR99, PA99, AUA99, RH99, ARH99, can-
assignp-M99, can-assignp-IM99, can-revokep-M99, and
can-revokep-IM99.
Output from MapPRA99 algorithm is an equivalent
ARPA instance, with primarily consisting of AUA,
AOPA, ROLESA, RHA, PERMSA, AATTA, PATTA, For
each attribute att ∈ AATTA ∪ PATTA, ScopeA(att),
attTypeA(att), is_orderedA(att) and HAatt, For each user
u ∈ AUA, and for each att ∈ AATTA, att(u), For
each permission p ∈ PERMSA, and for each att ∈
PATTA, att(p), Authorization rule for mobile assign
(auth_mob_assign), Authorization rule for mobile revoke
(auth_mob_revoke), Authorization rule for immobile as-
sign (auth_immob_assign), and Authorization rule for
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immobile revoke (auth_immob_revoke)
As shown in MapPRA99, there are four main steps
required in mapping any instance of PRA99 model to
ARPA instance. In Step 1, sets and functions from
PRA99 instance are mapped into ARPA sets and func-
tions. In Step 2, permission attributes and administrative
user attribute functions are expressed. There are four
permission attributes: exp_mob_mem, imp_mob_mem,
exp_immob_mem, and imp_immob_mem. Each captures,
a permission’s explicit mobile membership, implicit mo-
bile membership, explicit immobile membership and
implicit immobile membership on roles, respectively.
Admin user attribute aroles captures admin roles as-
signed to admin users. Step 3 involves construct-
ing assign-mob-formula and assign-immob-formula in
ARPA that is equivalent to can-assignp-M99 and can-
assignp-IM99, respectively. Both can-assignp-M99 and
can-assignp-IM99 are set of triples. Each triple bears
information on whether an admin role can assign a
candidate permission to a set of roles as a mobile
member in the case of can-assignp-M99 and, as an
immobile member in the case of can-assignp-IM99.
AURA equivalent for can-assignp-M99 is given by
is_authorizedPmob-assign(au : AU
A, p : PERMSA, r :
ROLESA) and an equivalent translation for can-assignp-
IM99 is given by is_authorizedPimmob-assign(au : AU
A, p :
PERMSA, r : ROLESA). Similarly, In Step 4, revoke-
mob-formula equivalent to can-revokep-M99 and can-
revokep-IM99 are presented. A support routine trans-
latep99 translates prerequisite condition in PRA99 into
its ARPA equivalent.
C. PRA02 in ARPA
1) PRA02 Instance: This section basically consists
of PRA02 example instance followed by its equivalent
ARPA instance. We also present a mapping algorithm,
MapPRA02. In PRA02, decision about permission-role
assignment and revocation is made on the basis of
two factors: a permission’s membership on role(s) or a
permission’s membership in organization unit(s). They
can be viewed as two different cases. In this example
instance we represent roles with r and organization units
with x, for simplicity and clarity.
Sets and functions:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}
• AR = {ar1, ar2}
• PERMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
• AUA = {(u3, ar1), (u4, ar2)}
• PA = {(p1, r1), (p1, r2), (p2, r3), (p2, r4)}
Algorithm 8. MapPRA02
Input: PRA02 instance
Output: AURA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in ARPA */
a. AUA ← AU02 ; AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
b. ROLESA ← ROLES02
c. RHA ← RH02 ; PERMSA ← PERMS02
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions to ARPA */
a. AATTA ← {aroles} ; ScopeA(aroles) = AR02
b. attTypeA(aroles) = set
c. is_orderedA(aroles) = True ; HAaroles ← ARH02
d. For each u ∈ AUA, aroles(u) = φ
e. For each (u, ar) in AUA02,
aroles(u)' = aroles(u) ∪ ar
f. PATTA ← {org_units, rolesp}
g. ScopeA(org_units) = ORGU02
h. attTypeA(org_units) = set
i. is_orderedA(org_units) = True
j. HAorg_units = OUH02
k. For each p ∈ PERMSA, org_units(p) = φ
l. For each (p, orgu) ∈ PPA02,
org_units(p)' = org_units(p) ∪ orgu
m. ScopeA(rolesp) = ROLESA
n. attTypeA(rolesp) = set
o. is_orderedA(rolesp) = True
p. HArolesp = RHA
q. For each p ∈ PERMSA, rolesp(p) = φ
r. For each (p, r) ∈ PPA02,
rolesp(p)' = rolesp(p) ∪ r
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in ARPA */
a. assign_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can_assignp02,
assign_formula' = assign_formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧
(translatep02(cr)))
c. auth_assign = is_authorizedassign(au : AUA,
p : PERMS A, r : ROLES A) ≡ assign_formula'
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule in ARPA */
a. revoke_formula = φ
b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can_revokep02,
revoke_formula' = revoke_formula ∨
((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z)
c. auth_revoke = is_authorizedrevoke(au : AU A,
p : PERMS A, r : ROLES A) ≡ revoke_formula'
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Support routine for algorithm 8. translatep02
Input: A PRA02 prerequisite condition (cr), Case 1,
Case 2
Output: An equivalent sub-rule for ARPA authorization
rule.
Begin:
1: rule_string = φ
2: Case Of selection
3: ' Case 1 ' (cr is based on roles) :
4: translatep97
5: ' Case 2 ' (cr is based on org_units):
6: For each symbol in cr
7: if symbol is an organization unit and in
the form x
(i.e., the permission has a membership on
organization unit x)
8: rule_string = rule_string + (∃x' ≥ x).
x' ∈ org_units(p)
9: else if symbol an organization unit
and in the form x¯
(i.e., the permission doesn’t have a membership
on organization unit x)
10: rule_string = rule_string + (∃x' ≥ x).
x' /∈ org_units(p)
11: else
12: rule_string = rule_string + symbol
/* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */
13: end if
14: end Case
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4), (r4, r5), (r5, r6)}
• ARH = {(ar1, ar2)}
• ORGU = {x1, x2, x3}
• OUH = {(x3, x2), (x2, x1)}
• PPA = {(p1, x1), (p2, x2), (p3, x3), (p1, x3)}
Case 1:
• CR = {r1 ∧ r2, r1 ∨ r¯2 ∧ x3}
Let cr1 = r1 ∧ r2 and, cr2 = r1 ∨ r¯2 ∧ r3
Case 2:
• CR = {x1 ∧ x2, x1 ∨ x¯2 ∧ x3}
Let cr3 = x1 ∧ x2 and, cr4 = x1 ∨ x¯2 ∧ x3
Prerequisite conditions are evaluated as follows:
Case 1:
cr1 is evaluated as follows:
For each p that is undertaken for assignment,
(∃r ≤ r1). (p, r) ∈ PA ∧ (∃r ≤ r2). (p, r) ∈ PA
cr2 is evaluated as follows: For each p that is undertaken
for assignment,
(∃r ≤ r1). (p, r) ∈ PA ∨ ¬((∀r ≤ r2). (p, r) ∈ PA) ∧
(∃r ≤ r3). (p, r) ∈ PA
Case 2:
cr3 is evaluated as follows:
For each p that is undertaken for assignment,
(∃x ≥ x1). (p, x) ∈ PPA ∧ (∃x ≥ x2). (p, x) ∈ PPA
cr4 is evaluated as follows:
For each p that is undertaken for assignment,
(∃x ≥ x1). (p, x) ∈ PPA ∨ ¬((∀x ≥ x2). (p, x) ∈ PPA)
∧ (∃x ≤ x3). (p, x) ∈ PPA
Let can_assignp and can_revokep be as follows:
Case 1:
can_assignp = {(ar1, cr1, {r4, r5}), (ar1, cr2, {r6})}
can_revokep = {(ar1, {r1, r3, r4})}
Case 2:
can_assignp = {(ar1, cr3, {r4, r5}), (ar1, cr4, {r6})}
can_revokep = {(ar1, {r1, r3, r4})}
2) Equivalent PRA02 Instance in ARPA: This seg-
ment presents an equivalent ARPA instance for afore-
mentioned example instance.
Sets and functions
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AOP = {assign, revoke}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4), (r4, r5), (r5, r6)}
• PERMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
• AATT = {aroles}
• Scope(aroles) = {ar1, ar2}, attType(aroles) = set
is_ordered(aroles) = True, Haroles = {(ar1, ar2)}
• aroles(u3) = {ar1}, aroles(u4) = {ar2}
• PATT = {rolesp, org_units}
• Scope(rolesp) = ROLES, attType(rolesp) = set
is_ordered(rolesp) = True, Hrolesp = RH,
• rolesp(p1) = {r1, r2}, rolesp(p2) = {r3, r4},
rolesp(p3) = {}, rolesp(p4) = {}
• Scope(org_units) = {x1, x2, x3},
attType(org_units) = set
is_ordered(org_units) = True,
Horg_units = {(x3, x2), (x2, x1)}
• org_units(p1) = {x1, x3}, org_units(p2) = {x2},
org_units(p3) = {x3}
For each op in AOP, authorization rule for permission
to role assignment and revocation can be expressed
respectively, as follows:
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Case 1:
For any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for assign-
ment,
– is_authorizedPassign(au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES)
≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {r4, r5} ∧
((∃r ≤ r1). r ∈ rolesp(p) ∧ (∃r ≤ r2). r ∈ rolesp(p)))
∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {r6} ∧
((∃r ≤ r1). r ∈ rolesp(p) ∨ (∃r ≤ r2). r /∈ rolesp(p) ∧
(∃r ≤ r3). r ∈ rolesp(p)))
For any pemrission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for revoca-
tion,
– is_authorizedPrevoke(au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES)
≡ (∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {r1, r3, r4}
Case 2:
or any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for assign-
ment,
– is_authorizedPassign(au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES)
≡
((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {r4, r5} ∧
((∃x ≥ x1). x ∈ org_units(p) ∧ (∃x ≥ x2).
x ∈ org_units(p))) ∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧
r ∈ {r6} ∧ ((∃x ≥ x1). x ∈ org_units(p) ∨ (∃x ≥ x2).
x /∈ org_units(p) ∧ (∃x ≥ x3). x ∈ org_units(p)))
For any pemrission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for
revocation,
– is_authorizedPrevoke(au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES)
≡ (∃ar ≥ ar1). ar ∈ aroles(p) ∧ r ∈ {r1, r3, r4}
3) MapßPRA02: Algorithm 8 facilitates mapping
for any PRA02 instance to equivalent ARPA in-
stance. Sets and functions from PRA02 and ARPA
are marked with superscripts 02 and A, respectively.
MapßPRA02 takes PRA02 instance as its input. In
particular, input for MapßPRA02 fundamentally has
USERS02, ROLES02, AR02, PERMS02, AUA02, PA02,
RH02, ARH02, can_assignp02, can_revokep02, ORGU02,
OUH02, and PPA02 Output from MapßPRA02 is an
equivalent ARPA instance, with primarily consisting
of AUA, AOPA, ROLESA, RHA, PERMSA, AATTA,
PATTA, For each attribute att ∈ AATTA ∪ PATTA,
RangeA(att), attTypeA(att), is_orderedA(att) and HAßatt,
For each user p ∈ PERMSA and for each att ∈ PATTA,
att(p), For each user u ∈ AUA and for each att ∈ AATTA,
att(u), Authorization rule to assign (auth_assignp), and
Authorization rule to revoke (auth_revokep)
As shown in Algorithm MapßPRA02, there are four
main steps required in mapping any instance of PRA02
model to ARPA instance. In Step 1, sets and functions
from PRA02 instance are mapped into ARPA sets and
functions. In Step 2, permission attributes and admin-
istrative user attribute functions are expressed. PATT
set has two permission attributes, org_units and rolesp.
org_units attribute captures a permission’s association
in an organization unit and rolesp captures roles to
which permission have been assigned to. There are
two ways a assignment decision is made in PRA02
which are marked as Case 1 and Case 2 in the model.
Case 1 checks for permission’s existing membership on
roles while Case 2 checks for user’s membership on
organization units. org_units is captured in Case 2. Case
1 is same as PRA97. Admin user attribute aroles captures
admin roles assigned to admin users. Step 3 involves
constructing assignp_formula in ARPA that is equivalent
to can_assignp02 in PRA02. can_assignp02 is a set of
triples. Each triple bears information on whether an
admin role can assign a candidate permission to a set of
roles. Equivalent translation in ARPA for PRA02 is given
by is_authorizedUßassign(au : AUA, u : USERSA, r :
ROLESA). Similarly, In Step 4, revoke_formula equiv-
alent to can_revokep02 is presented. A support routine
translateß02 translates prerequisite condition in PRA02
into its equivalent in ARPA.
D. Uni-ARBAC’s PRA in ARPA
1) Instance of PRA in Uni-ARBAC: In this section we
take an example instance for PRA in UARBAC (PRA-
U) model.
Traditional RBAC Sets & Relations:
• USERS = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3, r4}
• PERMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3)}
Addeditional RBAC Sets & Relations:
• T = {t1, t2, t3, t4}
• TH = {(t1, t2), (t2, t3), (t2, t4)}
• PA = {(p1, t1), (p1, t4), (p2, t4), (p4, t3), (p3, t2)}
• TA = {(t1, r2), (t2, r1), (t3, r4), (t4, r3)}
Derived functions
• authorized_perms(r1) = {p3}
• authorized_perms(r2) = {p1}
• authorized_perms(r3) = {p1, p2}
• authorized_perms(r4) = {p4}
Administrative Units and Partitioned Assignments
• AU = {au1, au2}
• roles(au1) = {r1, r2}, roles(au2) = {r3}
• tasks(au1) = {t1, t2}, tasks(au2) = {t3, t4}
Derived Function
• tasks*(au1) = {t1, t2, t3, t4}
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Algorithm 9. MapPRA-Uni-ARBAC
Input: Instance of PRA in Uni-ARBAC
Output: AURA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in ARPA */
a. AUA ← USERSUni ; AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
b. ROLESA ← ROLESUni ; RHA ← RHUni
c. PERMSA ← PERMSUni
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in ARPA */
a. AATTA ← {admin_unit, adminunit_role}
b. ScopeA(admin_unit) = AUUni
c. attTypeA(admin_unit) = set
d. is_orderedA(admin_unit) = True,
e. HAadmin_unit = AUH
Uni
f. For each u in AUA, admin_unit(u) = φ
g. For each (u, au) ∈ TA_adminUni,
admin_unit(u)' = admin_unit(u) ∪ au
h. attTypeA(adminunit_role) = set
i. is_orderedA(adminunit_role) = False,
j. Hadminunit_role = φ ; For each u in AU
A,
adminunit_role(u) = φ
k. For each (u, au) ∈ TA_adminUni and
for each r ∈ rolesUni(au),
adminunit_role(u)' = adminunit_role(u) ∪ (au, r)
l. PATTA ← {tasks, task_adminu}
m. ScopeA(tasks) = TUni ; attTypeA(tasks) = set
n. is_orderedA(tasks) = True ; HAtasks = TH
Uni
o. For each p in PERMSA, tasks(p) = φ ;
p. For each (p, t) ∈ PAUni, tasks(p)' = tasks(p) ∪ t
q. ScopeA(task_adminu) = TUni × AUUni
r. attTypeA(task_adminu) = set ;
s. is_orderedA(task_adminu) = False
t. HAtask_adminu = φ ; For each p in PERMS
A,
task_adminu(p) = φ
u. For each (p, t) ∈ PAUni and
for each t ∈ tasks*Uni(au),
task_adminu(p)' = task_adminu(p) ∪ (t, au)
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in ARPA */
a. can_manage_rule =
∃au1, au2 ∈ Scope(admin_unit). (au1, au2)
∈ Hadmin_unit ∧ (au1 ∈ admin_unit(u) ∧ (au2, r)
∈ adminunit_role(u)) ∧ ∃t1, t2 ∈ Scope(tasks).
Continuation of Algorithm 9. MapPRA-Uni-ARBAC
[(t1, t2) ∈ TH ∧ ∀q ∈ χ. t2 ∈ tasks(q) ∧
∃q' ∈ (PERMSA - χ). t2 /∈ tasks(q') ∧ (t2, au2) ∈
tasks_adminu(q)]
b. auth_assign = is_authorizedPassign(u : AU
A,
χ : 2PERMS
A
, r : ROLESA) ≡ can_manage_rule
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for ARPA */
a. auth_revoke = is_authorizedPrevoke(u : AU
A,
χ : 2PERMS
A
, r : ROLESA) ≡ can_manage_rule
• tasks*(au2) = {t3, t4}
Administrative User Assignments
• TA_admin = {(u1, au1), (u2, au2)}
• AUH = {(au1, au2)}
Task-role assignment condition in uni-ARBAC:
– can_manage_task_role(u : USERS, t: T, r: ROLES) =
(∃aui, auj)[(u, aui) ∈ TA_admin ∧ aui au auj ∧
r ∈ roles(auj) ∧ t ∈ tasks*(auj)]
2) Equivalent ARPA instance of PRA in Uni-ARBAC:
This section presents an equivalent instance for the
example instance presented in section V-D1.
Set and functions:
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AOP = {assign, revoke}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3, r4}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4)}
• PERMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
• AATT = {admin_unit, adminunit_role}
• Scope(admin_unit) = {au1, au2},
attType(admin_unit) = set,
is_ordered(admin_unit) = True,
Hadmin_unit = {(au1, au2)}
• admin_unit(u1) = {au1}, admin_unit(u2) = {au2},
admin_unit(u3) = {}, admin_unit(u4) = {}
• Scope(adminunit_role) = {(au1, r1), (au1, r2),
(au2, r3)},
attType(adminunit_role) = set,
is_ordered(adminunit_role) = False,
Hadminunit_role = φ
• adminunit_role(u1) = {(au1, r1), (au1, r2),
(au2, r3)}, adminunit_role(u2) = {(au2, r3)},
adminunit_role(u3) = {}, adminunit_role(u4) = {}
• PATT = {tasks, task_adminu}
• Scope(tasks) = {t1, t2, t3, t4},
attType(tasks) = set, is_ordered(tasks) = True,
Htasks = TH
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• tasks(p1) = {t1, t2, t4}, tasks(p2) = {t1, t2, t4},
tasks(p3) = {t1, t2}, tasks(p4) = {t1, t2, t3}
• Scope(task_adminu) = {(t1, au1), (t2, au2)},
attType(task_adminu) = set,
is_ordered(task_adminu) = False, Htask_adminu = φ
• task_adminu(p1) = {(t1, au1), (t4, au2)},
task_adminu(p2) = {(t4, au2)},
task_adminu(p3) = {(t2, au1)},
task_adminu(p4) = {(t3, au2)}
Set of permissions that are mapped to each task in T can
be expressed as follows:
Let each set be represented with χi as shown below.
(a) χ1 = {p | t1 ∈ tasks(p)}
(b) χ2 = {p | t2 ∈ tasks(p)}
(c) χ3 = {p | t3 ∈ tasks(p)}
(d) χ4 = {p | t4 ∈ tasks(p)}
For each χi in {χ1 , χ2 , χ3 , χ4 }, authorization rule for
whether an admin user in AU is authorized to assign χi
to a roles r in ROLES is given below:
– is_authorizedPassign(u : USERS, χi : 2
PERMS,
r : ROLES) ≡
∃au1, au2 ∈ Scope(admin_unit). (au1, au2) ∈ Hadmin_unit
∧ (au1 ∈ admin_unit(u) ∧ (au2, r)
∈ adminunit_role(u)) ∧ ∃t1, t2 ∈ Scope(tasks). [(t1, t2)
∈ TH ∧ ∀q ∈ χ. t2 ∈ tasks(q) ∧ ∃q' ∈ (PERMS - χ).
t2 /∈ tasks(q') ∧ (t2, au2) ∈ tasks_adminu(q)]
For each χi in {χ1 , χ2 , χ3 , χ4 }, authorization
function for whether an admin user in AU is authorized
to revoke χ from a roles r ∈ ROLES is given below:
– is_authorizedPrevoke(u : USERS, χi : 2
PERMS,
r : ROLES) ≡ is_authorizedPassign(u : USERS,
χi : 2
PERMS, r : ROLES)
3) MapPRA-Uni-ARBAC: MapPRA-Uni depicted as Algo-
rithm 9 translates instance of PRA in Uni-ARBAC to an
equivalent instance of ARPA. Sets and functions from
PRA-Uni and ARPA are marked with superscript Uni
and superscript A, repectively.
It takes following sets and functions from PRA-Uni as
an input that includes USERSUni, ROLESUni, PERMSUni,
RHUni, TUni, THUni, PAUni, AUUni, For each au in AUUni,
rolesUni(au) and tasks*Uni(au), TA_adminUni, AUHUni,
can_manage_task_role(u : USERSUni, t : TUni, r :
ROLESUni. Output is an equivalent ARPA instance
which includes AUA, AOPA, ROLESA, RHA, PERMSA,
AATTA, PATTA, For each attribute att ∈ AATTA ∪
PATTA, ScopeA(att), attTypeA(att), is_orderedA(att) and
HAatt, For each user u ∈ AUA, and for each att ∈ AATTA,
att(u), For each user p ∈ PERMSA, and for each att ∈
PATTA, att(t), Authorization rule for assigning permis-
sion (auth_assignp), and finally, Authorization rule for
revoking permission (auth_revokep).
MapPRA-Uni consists of four steps to complete trans-
lation. In Step 1 sets and functions from PRA-Uni
instance are mapped to ARPA instance. In Uni-ARBAC,
both admin users and regular users belong to same
set, USERSUni. Thus, USERSUni is mapped to AUA. In
Step 2, admin user attributes and pemrission attributes
are defined. There are two admin user attributes: ad-
min_unit and adminunit_role. admin_unit captures the
TA_adminUni relation in URA-Uni, and adminunit_role
captures admin user’s mapping with admin unit, and
the roles mapped to that admin unit. There are two
permission attributes: tasks and task_adminu. Attribute
tasks gives a mapping between permission and tasks.
That is for each permission p, tasks(p) yields set of
tasks it is mapped to. For a given pemission, attribute
task_adminu gives its mapping with tasks, and admin
units that each task is mapped to. Step 3 constructs an
assignment rule equivalent to can_manage_task_role(u
: USERSUni, t: TUni, r: ROLESUni) in Uni-ARBAC.
In PRA-Uni, it evaluates if an admin user u can as-
sign/revoke a task t to/from a role r if admin user u
has Task_adminUni relation with some admin unit au
to which task t and role r are mapped. An ARPA
equivalent assignment rule auth_assign is expressed in
Step 3 as is_authorizedPassign(u : USERS
A, χ : 2PERMS
A
,
r : ROLESA) and revoke rule auth_revoke in Step 4
as is_authorizedPrevoke(u : USERS
A, χ : 2PERMS
A
, r :
ROLESA. Authorization criteria for assign and revoke
is identical.
E. UARBAC’s PRA in ARPA
1) RBAC Model: UARBAC model is designed with
a notion of class objects. Thus, includes class level
administrative permissions as well. Following is RBAC
schema is presented as follows:
RBAC Schema:
RBAC Schemas is given by following tuple.
<C, OBJS, AM>
• C is a finite set of object classes with predefined
classes: user and role.
• OBJS(c) is a function that gives all possible names
for objects of the class c ∈ C.
Let USERS = OBJS(user) and ROLES =
OBJS(role)
• AM(c) is function that maps class c to a set of access
modes that can be applied on objects of class c.
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Algorithm 10. MapPRA-UARBAC
Input: Instance of PRA in UARBAC
Output: ARPA instance
Step 1: /* Map basic sets and functions in ARPA */
a. AUA ← USERSU ; AOPA ← {assign, revoke}
b. ROLESA ← ROLESU ; RHA ← RH U
c. PERMSA ← PERMSU
Step 2: /* Map attribute functions in ARPA */
a. AATTA ← {object_am, role_am, classp}
b. Scope(object_am) = OU × AM U(file)
c. attType(object_am) = set
d. is_ordered(object_am) = False, Hobject_am = φ
e. For each u in AUU, object_am(u) = φ
f. For each u in U U and for
each [c, o1, a] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
object_am(u)' = object_am(u) ∪ (o, a)
g. Scope(role_am) = ROLESU × AM U(role) ; att-
Type(role_am) = set
h. is_ordered(role_am) = False, Hrole_am = φ
i. For each u in AUA, role_am(u) = φ
j. For each u in U U for each
[c, r1, a] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
role_am(u)' = role_am(u) ∪ (r, a)
k. Scope(classp) = C U × {AM U(file) ∪ AM U(role)}
l. attType(classp) = set
m. is_ordered(classp) = False, Hclassp = φ
n. For each u in AUA, object_am(u) = φ
o. For each u in U U for
each [c, a] ∈ authorized_permsU[u],
classp(u)' = object_am(u) ∪ (c, a)
p. PATTA = {object_id}
q. Scope(object_id) = ROLESU ∪ PERMSU
r. attType(object_id) = atomic
s. is_ordered(object_id) = False, Hobject_id = φ
t. For each u in U U and for
each p ∈ authorized_permsU[u], where p is of
the
form [c, oi, a] or [c, a],
object_id(p) = oi or φ
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in ARPA */
a. assign_formula =
((object_id(p), admin) ∈ object_am(au) ∧
(r, empower) ∈ role_am(au)) ∨ ((file, admin)
∈ classp(au) ∧ (r, empower) ∈ role_am(au))
∨ ((object_id(p), admin) ∈ object_am(au) ∧
(role, empower) ∈ classp(au)) ∨ (file, admin)
∈ classp(au) ∧ (role, empower) ∈ classp(au))
Continuation from Algorithm 10. MapPRA-UARBAC
b. auth_assign = is_authorizedPassign(au : AU
A,
p : PERMSA, r : ROLESA) ≡ assign_formula
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for ARPA */
a. revoke_formula =
(object_id(p), admin) ∈ object_am(au) ∨
(r, admin) ∈ role_am(au)) ∨ (file, admin)
∈ classp(au) ∨ (role, admin) ∈ classp(au))
b. auth_revoke = is_authorizedPrevoke(au : AU
A,
p : PERMSA, r : ROLESA) ≡ revoke_formula
Access modes for two predefined classes user and role
are fixed. By observation we find it relevant to consider
files as resource objects. We take file as example resource
object to which we will define access.
AM(user) = {empower, admin}
AM(role) = {grant, empower, admin}
AM(file) = {read, write, append, execute,
admin}
RBAC Permissions:
There are two kinds of permissions in this RBAC model:
• Object permissions of the form,
[c, o, a], where c ∈ C, o ∈ OBJS(c), a ∈ AM(c).
• Class permissions of the form,
[c, a], where, c ∈ C, and a ∈ {create} ∪ AM(c).
RBAC State:
Given an RBAC Schema, an RBAC state is given by,
<OB, UA, PA, RH>
• OB is a function that maps each class in C to a
finite set of object names of that class that currently
exists, i.e., OB(c) ⊆ OBJS(c).
Let OB(user) = USERS, OB(role) = ROLES
and, let OB(file) = FILES
Set of permissions, P, is given by
P = {[c, o, a] | c ∈ C ∧ o ∈ OBJS(c) ∧ a ∈ AM(c)}
∪ {[c, a] | c ∈ C ∧ a ∈ {create} ∪ AM(c)}
• UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, user-role assignment
relation.
• PA ⊆ P × ROLES, permission-role assignment
relation.
• RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, partial order in ROLES
denoted by RH.
Administrative permissions in UARBAC:
All the permissions of user u who performs administra-
tive operations can be calculated as follows:
• authorized_perms[u] = {p ∈ P | ∃r1, r2 ∈ R [(u, r1)
∈ UA ∧ (r1 RH r2) ∧ (r2, p) ∈ PA]}
28
Permission-Role Administration
Operations required to assign object permission [c, o1,
a1] to role r1 and to revoke object permission [c, o1, a1]
from role r1 are respectively listed below:
• grantObjPermToRole([c, o1, a1], r1)
• revokeObjPermFromRole([c, o1, a1], r1)
An admin user requires one of the following two per-
missions to conduct grantObjPermToRole([c, o1, a1], r1)
operation.
1) [c, o1, admin] and [role, r1, empower] or,
2) [c, o1, admin] and [role, empower] or,
3) [c, admin] and [role, r1, empower] or,
4) [c, admin] and [role, empower]
An admin user requires one of the following per-
mission(s) (single or a pair) to conduct revokeOb-
jPermFromRole([c, o1, a1], r1) operation.
1) [c, o1, admin] and [role, r1, empower] or,
2) [c, o1, admin] or,
3) [role, r1, admin] or,
4) [c, admin] or,
5) [role, admin]
2) Instance of PRA in UARBAC:
RBAC Schema
Let us consider objects, to which users need access via
roles, to be of class file.
• C = {user, role, file}
• OBJS(user) = USERS,
• OBJS(role) = ROLES
• OBJS(file) = FILES
Access modes for role and file class are as follows:
• AM(role) = {grant, empower, admin}
• AM(file) = {read, write, append, execute,
admin}
RBAC State
• USERS = OBJ(user)= {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• ROLES = OBJ(role)= {r1, r2, r3, r4}
• O = OBJ(file)= {o1, o2, o3}
• P = {[role, r1, grant], [role, r1, empower], [role,
r1, admin], [role, r2, grant], [role, r2, empower],
[role, r2, admin], [role, r3, grant], [role, r3,
empower], [role, r3, admin], [role, r4, grant],
[role, r4, empower], [role, r4, admin], [file, o1,
read], [file, o1, write], [file, o1, append], [file, o1,
execute], [file, o1, admin]
[file, o2, read], [file, o2, write], [file, o2, append],
[file, o2, execute], [file, o2, admin]
[file, o3, read], [file, o3, write], [file, o3, append],
[file, o3, execute], [file, o3, admin]
[file, read], [file, write], [file, append], [file, exe-
cute], [file, admin]}
• PA = {([file, o1, read], r1), ([file, o2, execute],
r1), ([file, o2, execute], r2), ([file, o3, admin], r3),
([file, o1, read], r3), ([file, o3, write], r2)}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4)}
Authorized permissions in UARBAC
Following is the list of authorized permissions admin
each user has, which includes administrative permissions
for permission-role assignment:
• authorized_perms[u1] = {[file, o1, read], [role, r1,
grant], [file, o1, write], [role, r3, grant], [file, o2,
admin], [file, o3, append],[role, r2, grant], [file,
o3, admin], [role, r1, admin], [role, r4, admin]}
• authorized_perms[u2] = {[file, o1, append], [role,
r1, grant], [file, o2, admin], [role, r2, grant]}
• authorized_perms[u3] = {[file, admin]}
• authorized_perms[u4] = {}
Permission-Role assignment condition in UARBAC’s PRA:
One can perform following operation to assign a
permission [file, o1, a] to a role r1.
• grantObjPermToRole([file, o1, a], r1)
To perform aforementioned operation one needs the
following two permissions:
• [file, o1, admin] and [role, r1, empower]
Condition for revoking permission-role in UARBAC’s PRA:
One can perform following operation to revoke a user
[file, o1, a] to a role r1.
• revokeObjPermFromRole([file, o1, a], r1)
To perform aforementioned operation one needs one of
the following permissions:
• [file, o1, admin] or,
• [role, r1, admin]
3) Equivalent ARPA instance of PRA in UARBAC:
This section presents an equivalent ARPA instance for
the example instance depicted in previous section.
Sets and functions
• AU = {u1, u2, u3, u4}
• AOP = {assignp, revokep}
• ROLES = {r1, r2, r3, r4}
• RH = {(r1, r2), (r2, r3), (r3, r4)}
• PERMS = {[role, r1, grant], [role, r1, empower],
[role, r1, admin], [role, r2, grant], [role, r2, em-
power], [role, r2, admin], [role, r3, grant], [role,
r3, empower], [role, r3, admin], [role, r4, grant],
[role, r4, empower], [role, r4, admin], [file, o1,
read], [file, o1, write], [file, o1, append], [file, o1,
execute], [file, o1, admin]
29
[file, o2, read], [file, o2, write], [file, o2, append],
[file, o2, execute], [file, o2, admin]
[file, o3, read], [file, o3, write], [file, o3, append],
[file, o3, execute], [file, o3, admin]
[file, read], [file, write], [file, append], [file, exe-
cute], [file, admin]}
• AATT = {object_am, role_am, classp}
• Scope(object_am) = {(o1, read), (o1, write), (o1,
execute), (o1, append), (o1, admin), (o2, read),
(o2, write), (o2, append), (o2, execute), (o2, ad-
min), (o3, read), (o3, write), (o3, append), (o3,
execute), (o3, admin)},
attType(object_am) = set,
is_ordered(object_am) = False, Hobject_am = φ
• Scope(role_am) = {(r1, grant), (r1,empower),
(r1, admin), (r2, grant), (r2, empower), (r2, ad-
min), (r3, grant), (r3, empower), (r3, admin), (r4,
grant), (r4, empower), (r4, admin)},
attType(role_am) = set,
is_ordered(role_am) = False, Hrole_am = φ
• Scope(classp) = {(file, read), (file, write), (file, ap-
pend), (file, execute), (file, admin), (role, grant),
(role, empower), (role, admin)},
attType(classp) = set, is_ordered(classp) = False,
Hclassp = φ
• object_am(u1) = {(o1, read), (o1, write), (o2, ad-
min), (o3, append), (o3, admin)}
• object_am(u2) = {(o1, append), (o2, admin)}
• object_am(u3) = {}, object_am(u4) = {}
• role_am(u1) = {(r1, grant), (r2, grant), (r3, grant),
(r1, admin), (r4, admin)}
• role_am(u2) = {(r1, grant), (r2, grant)}
• role_am(u3) = {}, role_am(u4) = {}
• classp(u1) = {}
• classp(u2) = {}
• classp(u3) = {(file, admin)}
• classp(u4) = {}
• PATT = {object_id}
• Scope(object_id) = {r1, r2, r3, r4, o1, o2, o3},
attType(object_id) = atomic,
is_ordered(object_id) = False, Hobject_am = φ
object_id for each permission p in PERMS is given by,
object_id(p) = oi.
For each op in AOP, authorization function for
assignment and revocation of permission of the form
p = [file, o, a] to role r can be expressed as follows:
For any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for assign-
ment,
– is_authorizedPassign(u : AU, p : PERMS,
r : ROLES) ≡
((object_id(p), admin) ∈ object_am(u) ∧ (r, empower)
∈ role_am(u)) ∨ ((file, admin) ∈ classp(u) ∧
(r, empower) ∈ role_am(u)) ∨ ((object_id(p), admin)
∈ object_am(u) ∧ (role, empower) ∈ classp(u))
∨ (file, admin) ∈ classp(u)
∧ (role, empower) ∈ classp(u))
For any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for
revocation,
– is_authorizedPrevoke(u : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES)
≡
(object_id(p), admin) ∈ object_am(u) ∨ (r, admin)
∈ role_am(u) ∨ (file, admin) ∈ classp(u) ∨
(role, admin) ∈ classp(u)
4) MapPRA-UARBAC: Algorithm 10 maps any instance
of PRA in UARBAC [8] (PRA-U) to its equivalent
ARPA instance. For clarity, sets and function from
UARBAC model are labeled with superscript U, and that
of ARPA with superscript A.
MapPRA-UARBAC takes following sets and functions
as input from PRA-U model. C U, USERSU, ROLESU,
PERMSU, PAU, RH U, AM U(role), AM U(file), For each u
∈ USERSU, authorized_perms[u], For each [file, o1, a] ∈
PERMSU and for each r1 ∈ ROLESU, grantObjPermTo-
Role([file, o1, a], r1) is true if the granter has one of the
following combination of permissions:
1) [file, o1, admin] and [role, r1, empower], or
2) [file, o1, admin] and [role, empower], or
3) [file, admin] and [role, r1, empower], or
4) [file, admin] and [role, empower]
For each [file, o1, a] ∈ PERMSU and for each r1 ∈
ROLESU, revokeObjPermFromRole([file, o1, a], r1) is
true if the granter has either of the following permissions:
1) [file, o1, admin] or,
2) [role, r1, admin] or,
3) [file, admin] or,
4) [role, admin]
Output from MapPRA-UARBAC algorithm is an equiva-
lent ARPA instance, with primarily consisting of AUA,
AOPA, ROLESA, RHA, PERMSA, AATTA, PATTA, For
each attribute att ∈ AATTA ∪ PATTA, Scope(att), att-
Type(att), is_ordered(att) and Hatt, For each user u ∈
AUA, and for each att ∈ AATTA ∪ PATTA, att(u), Autho-
rization rule for assign (auth_assign), and Authorization
rule for revoke (auth_revoke)
Step 1 in MapPRA-UARBAC involves translating sets and
functions from PRA-U to ARPA equivalent sets and
functions. In Step 2, permission attributes and admin
user attributes functions are defined. There exists one
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permission attributes object_id, which captures id of
an object for given permission. Note that a permission
defines class type, object id and access mode. ARPA
defines three admin user attributes: object_am, role_am
and classp. object_am attribute captures an admin user’s
access mode towards an object. Similarly, role_am cap-
tures an admin user’s access mode towards a role. An
admin user can also have a class level access mode
captured by attribute classp. With class level access
mode, an admin user gains authority over an entire class
of objects. For example [grant, role] admin permission
provides an admin user with power to grant any role.
In Step 3, assign_formula for ARPA that is equiva-
lent to grantObjPermToRole([file, o1, a], r1) in PRA-U
is established. Equivalent assign_formula is expressed
as is_authorizedPassign(au1 : AU
A, p : PERMSA, r1
: ROLESA) using attributes of permissions and ad-
min user. Step 4 establishes revoke_formula equiva-
lent to revokeRoleFromUser(u1, r1). It is expressed
as is_authorizedPrevoke(au1 : AU
A, p : PERMSA, r1 :
ROLESA) using attributes of permissions and admin
user.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented our design for attribute
based administration of RBAC (AARBAC). We de-
veloped AURA model for user-role assignment and
ARPA model for permission-role assignment. We then
supported these models with their extensive example
instances and mapping algorithms. Both the models
utilized attributes of RBAC components in making as-
signment or revocation decision. Role-role assignment
(RRA) is an essential part of RBAC administration. We
view attribute based RRA as our immediate future work.
One of the motivations behind our design approach for
AURA and ARPA models was to make them sufficient
enough to represent prior ARBAC models. For that mat-
ter, we have presented MapURA97, MapURA99, MapURA02,
MAPURA-Uni-ARBAC and MapURA-UARBAC algorithms that
demonstrated m mapping of prior URA model instances
into their respective equivalent AURA instances. Sim-
ilarly, we presented MapPRA97, MapPRA99, MapPRA02,
MAPPRA-Uni-ARBAC and MapPRA-UARBAC algorithms that
demonstrated mapping of prior PRA model instances
into their equivalent ARPA instances. We note that our
models are not limited to expressing prior ARBAC
models and carries the potential to express more.
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